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On April 5, 1999, the Supreme Court ruled that the police search
of Sandra Houghton's purse was constitutional. Houghton was one
of two female passengers in a car that was stopped for speeding and
driving with a faulty brake light. When an officer questioned the
driver about a hypodermic syringe in his shirt pocket, the driver said
he used the syringe to take drugs. The occupants of the car were
then ordered out. The police searched Houghton's purse, which was
on the backseat, and they discovered narcotics inside. The Court
held that the search was permissible even though the police had no
reason to believe that the purse contained drugs. It reasoned that
probable cause to believe that narcotics present in a car gives the po-
lice discretion to search all containers in the car capable of holding
narcotics.'
Two months after Houghton was decided, the Court invalidated
Chicago's gang congregation ordinance. Chicago v. Morale con-
cerned a law that barred criminal street gang members from loitering
with one another or with others in a public place. The law had four
components. First, a police officer must have had probable cause to
believe that one of the two or more persons present in a public place
is a street gang member. Second, the persons involved must have
been "loitering," which was defined as remaining in a public place
"with no apparent purpose." Third, the officer must have ordered
the persons to leave the area. Fourth, any person who disobeyed the
dispersal order would be arrested. Six members of the Court con-
cluded that the ordinance was too vague because it failed to provide
minimal guidelines to control police discretion when enforcing the
law.
The main source of discretionary police power was the ordi-
nance's definition of "loitering." Under the ordinance, if an officer
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believed that a gang member and others were in a public sqace "ith
no apparent purpose," such conduct constituted loitering. The or-
dinance provided officers with no guidelines or criteria for deciding
whether a group of persons in a public place had an apparent pur-
pose. According to the Court, "[t]he 'no apparent purpose' standard
for making that decision is inherently subjective because its applica-
tion depends on whether some purpose is 'apparent' to the officer on
the scene."4 The Court was also troubled by the scope of the ordi-
nance. Not only did the ordinance affect a substantial amount of in-
nocent conduct, but it also applied to "everyone in the city who may
remain in one place with one suspected gang member as long as their
purpose is not apparent to an officer observing them."'  In sum, the
Court invalidated the ordinance because it did not provide sufficient
minimal standards to guide police.
Viewed doctrinally, Houghton and Aforales are like apples and or-
anges. Houghton is the most recent application of the Court's auto-
mobile search doctrine. Where police have probable cause that con-
traband or criminal evidence may be inside a car, they have
unchecked discretion to search anywhere in the car and anything
therein that is capable of holding the object of the search. The ab-
sence of any evidence that suggested Houghton's purse contained
drugs is irrelevant. "A passenger's personal belongings, just like the
driver's belongings or containers attached to the car like a glove
compartment, are 'in' the car, and the officer has probable cause to
search for contraband in the car."6 Therefore, although the search of
a woman's purse is a severe intrusion of privacy' and the cause for
such an intrusion in this case was unjustified," the Court determined
3 The Illinois Supreme Court had interpreted "no apparent purpose" as -providing] abso-
lute discretion to police officers to determine what activities constitute loitering." Id. at 61
(quoting Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 63 (i1. 1997)). The Morales Court explained that
it had "no authority to construe the language of a state statute more narrowly than the con-
struction given by that State's highest court." Id. (footnote omitted).
4 Id. at 62.
Si at 62-63.
6 Houghton, 526 U.S. at 302.
SeeNewJersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 375 (1985) ('The search ofa young -woman's purse
by a school administrator is a serious invasion of her legitimate expectations of privacy.");
United States v. Welch, 4 F.3d 761, 764 (9th Cir. 1993) ('[A] purse is a tpe of container in
which a person possesses the highest expectation of privacy."); State v. Johnston. 645 P.2d 63.
64 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) ("It would be difficult to define an object more inherently private
than the contents of a woman's purse."); 3 WAYNE R. LF.kE, SEARcH .kxD SEiZF-RE § 7.2. at 69
(3d ed. Supp. 2000) (remarking that containers such as purses "seldom contain anything other
than the passenger's personal effects"); Christopher Slobogin &Joseph E. Schwnacher. Reason-
able Expectations of Privacy and Autonorr in Fourth Amendment ases.: An Ernpmcal Lcvh at "Under-
standings Recognized and Pemitted by Societ. ;"42 DtKE LJ. 727,738 (1993) (noting that the search
of a high school student's purse was ranked within the top ten most intrusive search and sei-
zure scenarios" in a public survey of expectations of privacy); Marianne Means, A Purse Is More
Than a Container, SuN-SENTiNTEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Apr. 10. 1999, at 13A (arguing that a uarrant-
less search of a woman's purse is an invasion of her privacy).
8 The officer who searched Houghton's purse testified at the suppression hearing that he
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that the search of Houghton's purse was "reasonable" under the
Fourth Amendment 9 Ironically, a purse found inside a car is not af-
forded the protection of a neutral magistrate's determination of
cause to search it, but a briefcase discovered at a murder scene inside
a home is afforded such protection. °
Morales, on the other hand, concerns vagueness law. Under the
vagueness doctrine, a criminal statute must satisfy two requirements.
First, the challenged statute must provide fair and adequate notice of
what conduct the law prohibits so that the ordinary person can avoid
arrest and prosecution. Second, the statute must not authorize or
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory law enforcement. In Morales,
a majority of the Court did not agree whether Chicago's statute satis-
fied the fair notice requirement. However, a six-Justice majority did
conclude that Chicago's statute failed the second prong of the
vagueness doctrine and that Chicago's ordinance did not provide
clear guidelines to control police discretion.
Although Houghton and Morales are doctrinally dissimilar, a com-
parison of the rulings removed from their doctrinal boxes indicates a
"had no probable cause to search Ms. Houghton's purse and that men do not usually carry
purses." Respondent's Brief at 1. The Wyoming Supreme Court found that "there was no
probable cause to search [Houghton's] personal effects and no reason to believe that contra-
band had been placed within the purse .... " Houghton v. Wyoming, 956 P.2d 363, 372 (Wyo.
1998). In the Supreme Court, Wyoming conceded that the officer who searched Houghton's
purse lacked "probable cause specific to the purse or passenger." Houghton, 526 U.S. at 309
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Pet. for Cert. i). For a detailed discussion of Houghton's treat-
ment of probable cause, see George M. Dery III, Improbable Cause: The Court's Purposeful Evasion
of a Traditional Fourth Amendment Protection in Wyoming v. Houghton, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
547, 581-87 (2000). Professor Dery argues that "[i]nstead of maintaining a particularity re-
quirement where an officer may intrude only where he or she has justification to search, Hough-
ton has expanded official search powers once probable cause in a general place, such as a vehi-
cle, is established." Id. at 590-91.
9 Arguably, Houghton authorizes a general search. See Erin Morris Meadows, Case Note, Bet-
ter-Off Walking: Wyoming v. Houghton Exemplfies What Acevedo Failed to Rectify, 34 U. RiCH. L.
REV. 329, 349-50 (2000) ("[The upshot of Houghton is] that a general search of a vehicle and all
of its contents is permitted, even if probable cause attached to only one person or container.
Before Houghton, if a police officer had specific probable cause relating to just one bag, that one
bag was all he could search. With the new Houghton rule, if probable cause exists to believe that
one person is transporting drugs, then the scope of the warrantless search includes all the oc-
cupants' belongings located within the vehicle." (footnotes omitted)). See also Sara L. Shaeffer,
Note, Another Dent in Our Fourth Amendment Rights: The Supreme Court's Precarious Extension of the
Automobile Exception in Wyoming v. Houghton, 45 S.D. L. REV. 422, 448 (2000). Shaeffer main-
tains that in the absence of individualized suspicion, "the search of a container that belongs to a
passenger, whom police do not suspect of a crime, would be supported only by the theory of
guilt by association," which the Court has previously rejected. Id. (citations omitted). "The
Houghton decision, however, legitimizes the theory of guilt by association and deprives all per-
sons traveling in vehicles the right to be free from unreasonable searches." Id.
10 See Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11 (1999) (per curiam). Decided during the Term
after Houghton, Hippo ruled that police violated the Fourth Amendment when they searched a
briefcase that had been found at a murder scene inside Flippo's cabin without first obtaining a
search warrant. For a fuller discussion of Hippo, see Milton Hirsch & David 0. Markus, Fourth
Amendment Forum: The Supreme Court's Latest Word: Get a Warrant!, THE CHAMPION, Apr. 2000, at
49.
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paradox in the Court's thinking: the Court is clearly of two minds
regarding the Constitution's tolerance for police discretion." Despite
an explicit reference in the Constitution's text that limits governmen-
tal intrusions, the Court's Fourth Amendment cases regularly allow
police broad discretion in conducting searches and seizures. At the
same time, the Court's vagueness cases have invalidated criminal stat-
utes-even when they do not directly affect any enumerated right-
when the statutes grant police too much discretion. This tension in
the Court's thinking was highlighted by Justice Thomas's dissent in
Morales. Justice Thomas disagreed with the majority's conclusion that
Chicago's ordinance granted too much discretion to police. In par-
ticular, he noted that the ordinance did nothing more than "confirm
the well-established principle that the police have the duty and the
power to maintain the public peace, and, when necessary, to disperse
groups of individuals who threaten it' "2 Injustice Thomas's view the
ordinance maintained the right balance between providing objective
guidelines for police and not constraining their every move. He
noted:
Just as we trust officers to rely on their experience and expertise in order
to make spur-of-the-moment determinations about amorphous legal
standards such as "probable cause" and "reasonable suspicion," so we
must trust them to determine whether a group of loiterers contains indi-
viduals (in this case members of criminal street gangs) whom the city has
determined threaten the public peace. ' s
Simply put, Justice Thomas believed that the reasoning and result
in Morales could not be reconciled with the Court's Fourth Amend-
ment rulings."
Justice Thomas's conclusions in Morales were both right and
wrong. Although his cursory reference to the probable cause and
reasonable suspicion standards hardly makes the point, justice Tho-
mas correctly noted that the police discretion authorized by Chi-
cago's ordinance is quite similar to the police discretion routinely
sanctioned by the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. For
n Thanks to David Cole for helping me see how the Court's thinking can be revealed by)
doctrinally dissimilar cases. S4 eg., David Cole, 7he Value of S&nng 7741g Difffrmtly: Boeme v.
Flores and CongressionalEnforcement of the Bill of Right. 1997 SuP. CT. REv. 31 (exemplifying how
a basic tension in the Court's interpretation of the Constitution may be explored by comparing
two cases that appear to have little in common).
2 Moraes, 527 U.S. at 101-02 (Thomas.J.. dissenting).
13 Id. at 109-10 (ThomasJ., dissenting).
14 Id. ("In sum, the Court's conclusion that the ordinance is impermissibly %ague because it
.necessarily entrusts lawnaking to the moment-to-momentjudgment of the policeman on his
beat,' cannot be reconciled with common sense, longstanding police practice, or this Court's
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence." (internal citation omitted)); s'e also Debra Uvingston.
Gang Loitering; The Court, and Some Realism About Police Patrol 1999 SUP CT. REv. 141, 179 [here-
inafter Livingston, Gang Loitering] ("The Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, however,
substantially undercuts the persuasiveness of the majority's position that te 'no apparent pur-
pose' language in Chicago's ordinance conferred on police a 'vast discretion' too extravagant to
be endured." (footnote omitted)).
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example, in the two Terms prior to Morales, the Court issued three
opinions affording police substantial discretion to search or seize citi-
zens during ordinary encounters. In one case, the Court ruled that
police could arbitrarily order passengers out of cars during routine
traffic stops.' In a second case, the Court held that a motorist who
has been stopped for a traffic violation need not be informed of his
right to leave the scene before being questioned by a police officer
about the contents of his vehicle and his willingness to allow a con-
sent search of his car.' 6 Finally, in a third case, the Court ruled that
pretextual traffic stops did not violate the Fourth Amendment.'7
15 Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997). Twenty years earlier, in Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam), the Court ruled that police could arbitrarily order drivers
out of their cars during routine traffic stops.
16 Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996).
17 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). IWren establishes that a "decision to stop an
automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation
has occurred." Id. at 810. The officer's motivation for the stop is irrelevant. Id. at 813. Criti-
cism of Whren is widespread. See, e.g.,Janet Koven Levit, Pretextual Traffic Stops: United States v.
Whren and the Death of Terry v. Ohio, 28 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 145 (1996) (arguing that with Whren
drivers and passengers have lost virtually all of their Fourth Amendment protections); Tracey
Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REv. 333, 340 (1998) ("In light of past and
present tensions between the police and minority groups, it is startling that the Court would
ignore racial concerns when formulating constitutional rules that control police discretion to
search and seize persons on the street."); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between
Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 67 n.229 (1997) ([Whren gives police] a
grant of discretionary power to stop, question, and (in jurisdictions that classify traffic offenses
as crimes) search and arrest suspects based on unarticulated suspicion of other crimes, or
worse, based on the officer's whim or prejudice."); Chris K. Visser, Comment, Without a Warrant,
Probable Cause, or Reasonable Suspicion: Is There Any Meaning to the Fourth Amendment While Driving
a Car, 35 HOUS. L. REv. 1683, 1706 (1999) ("For a motorist.., there is little safeguard left
[against arbitrary police invasions] because, under IWren, a vehicle stop is 'reasonable' when-
ever it is supported by probable cause that a mere traffic violation has occurred."); Lisa Walter,
Comment, Eradicating Racial Stereotyping from Terry Stops: The Case for an Equal Protection Exclu-
sionary Rule, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 255, 279 (2000) (criticizing Whren for not recognizing that
there is no suppression remedy under the Equal Protection Clause). Because every motorist
will commit a traffic violation sooner or later, Whren effectively overrules Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648 (1979), thereby eliminating Fourth Amendment scrutiny of the decision to make a
traffic stop. Cf WilliamJ. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1265, 1271-72 (1999) [hereinafter Stuntz, Distribution] ("Traffic violations are sufficiently
common that, if this authority were used widely enough, automobile stops could become effec-
tively unregulated. In an odd way, Whren shows how broad police authority over pedestrians is,
for Whren does no more than narrow the gap between Fourth Amendment protection for driv-
ers and the rules for police-citizen encounters. The police can, after all, already 'stop' pedestri-
ans without cause, given that every street encounter is functionally a stop."). For additional
criticism of Whren, see 1 WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.4, at 12-28 (3d ed. Supp.
2000); David A. Harris, Car Wars: The Fourth Amendment's Death on the Highway, 66 CEO. WASH. L.
REV. 556, 558-61 (1998) [hereinafter Harris, Car Wars]; David A. Harris, "Driving While Black"
and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 544, 554 (1997);Jennifer A. Larrabee, "DWB (Driving While Black)" and Equal Pro-
tection: The Realities of an Unconstitutional Police Practice 6J.L. & POL'Y 291 (1997); Wesley Mac-
Neil Oliver, With an Evil Eye and an Unequal Hand: Pretextual Stops and Doctrinal Remedies to Racial
Profiling, 74 TUL. L. REv. 1409 (2000); David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the
Future of the Fourth Amendment 1997 Sup. CT. REV. 271; Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual
Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 956 (1999); Christopher Hall, Note,
Challenging Selective Enforcement of Traffic Regulations After the Disharmonic Convergence: Whren v.
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Moreover, during the same Term in which Morales was decided,
the Court handed down two other rulings-in addition to Houghion-
that gave police discretionary power to exercise particularly intrusive
conduct. Florida v. White8 held that police have the power to seize a
vehicle from a public place when they have probable cause that it is
forfeitable contraband, even though the owner of the vehicle is in
custody and the police give no reasons for their failure to obtain a
warrant authorizing the seizure. In the second case, Minnesota v. Car-
ter,19 which was decided six months before Morales, the Court ruled
that houseguests may not always rely upon the security and privacy of
their host's home to challenge suspicionless surveillance of the home
by the police.
If one considers the various types of police power authorized by
the Court's Fourth Amendment cases immediately preceding Morales,
the Chicago ordinance appears to grant a reasonable degree of po-
lice authority. Under Chicago's ordinance, an officer's power to ar-
rest was conditioned upon a determination of probable cause that a
criminal gang member was present in a public place with no appar-
ent purpose, in addition to a refusal to obey an unequivocal order to
leave the scene. If the Court were applying a "reasonableness" analy-
sis, surely this degree of police discretion and authority would be a
permissible law enforcement tool, particularly where the record
showed that "a continuing increase in criminal street gang activity was
largely responsible for the city's rising murder rate, as well as an esca-
lation of violent and drug related crimes."" Indeed, one could credi-
bly argue that the discretion authorized by Chicago's ordinance fits
comfortably within a constitutional jurisprudence that allows the po-
lice arbitrarily to order motorists and passengers out of their cars dur-
ing routine traffic stops, that permits the search of a woman's purse
without specific cause, and that allows police arbitrarily to monitor
the activities inside a private home by peering through gaps in closed
window blinds.' When seen in this light, Justice Thomas's assertion
that the result in Morales cannot be reconciled with the Court's
Fourth Amendment doctrine seems understated, to say the least.
Although Justice Thomas accurately notes that the discretion
authorized under Chicago's ordinance was similar to the type of po-
lice discretion that the Court routinely sanctions in Fourth Amend-
United States, United States v. Armstrong, and tw Evolution of Polke Disrtzion, 76 TEX L REV.
1083 (1998).
is 526 U.S. 559 (1999).
19 525 U.S. 83 (1998).
O Morales, 527 U.S. at 46.
21 Cf Livingston, Gang Loitering, supra note 14, at 16667 ('[Tlhe Court's own Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence-its endorsement of warrantless police actions premised on admit-
tedly nebulous concepts like probable cause-vests police with a significant degree of street-
level discretion that is hard to reconcile with the Morales majority's condemnation of the discre-
tion involved in applying Chicago's gang loitering ordinance.").
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ment cases, Justice Thomas reaches the wrong conclusion in Morales.
Chicago's ordinance was unconstitutional because it afforded police
too much discretion to order people to "move on." Instead of shap-
ing vagueness doctrine to mirror the discretion afforded officers un-
der the Fourth Amendment, as Justice Thomas would have it, Fourth
Amendment doctrine should recognize and adopt "the more impor-
tant aspect of vagueness doctrine, 22 which is the establishment of"guidelines to prevent 'arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement' of
the law."23 In other words, now that the constitutional norm of con-
trolling police discretion is an essential feature of vagueness law and
provides an independent basis to invalidate a criminal statute that
does not implicate a constitutional right, then that same constitu-
tional principle can (and should) assist the Court in determining
whether a challenged police intrusion violates the guarantees of the
Fourth Amendment.
Using the result in Morales as a starting point, this article will ex-
amine the constitutional norm of controlling police discretion. My
focus will be on the Fourth Amendment. However, Morales's conclu-
sion that the Constitution requires the establishment of guidelines
and rules to prevent arbitrary and discretionary law enforcement will
be the underlying theme that connects the discussion of Fourth
Amendment cases that might otherwise appear dissimilar.
Part I examines the legal principle emerging from Morales. First,
because Morales has received heavy criticism from some quarters, '2 I
consider whether the norm of controlling police discretion is a le-
gitimate constitutional principle thatjustifies judicial invalidation of a
statute. Next, I assess whether the norm of requiring minimal guide-
lines to control police discretion, which is now a robust component
of vagueness doctrine, is an appropriate device for deciding the con-
stitutionality of police intrusions under the Fourth Amendment. Part
I concludes that the norm of controlling police discretion is not only
an appropriate tool for measuring the constitutionality of police
n Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983).
SAlorales, 527 U.S. at 64-65 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment).
24 See Alfred Hill, Vagueness and Police Discretion: The Supreme Court in a Bog, 51 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1289, 1290 (1999) ("If the statute itself must now contain additional guidelines to forestall
[police] misconduct, what should such guidelines be? This question is not easily answered ....
The Court created this dilemma not by a process of reasoning but by stumbling."); Livingston,
Gang Loitering, supra note 14, at 164 ("On closer inspection.... Morales evinces a deeper prob-
lem-a real inability on the part of the majority to offer even a facially plausible account of the
role that the vagueness doctrine actually plays in constraining the opportunity for arbitrary and
discriminatory law enforcement by local police."); see also Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares,
Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1167 (1998) (criticizing the
Court for closely scrutinizing police discretion affecting minority citizens because minority
communities can protect their legal rights through the political process). But cf Dorothy E.
Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing 89 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 780-89 (1999) (applauding the result in Morales because vague
laws give police license to harass and arrest people based on race-based suspicions).
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searches and seizures, but actually better promotes the central pur-
pose of the Fourth Amendment than the "reasonableness" analysis
currently employed by the Court.
Part II of the article considers how some of the Court's most re-
cent search and seizure cases might have been decided if controlling
police discretion, instead of reasonableness, were the touchstone of
Fourth Amendment analysis. First, I will examine the Court's meth-
odology for deciding whether Fourth Amendment protection is trig-
gered in a particular context. The Court's current method for decid-
ing whether police conduct is a "search" meriting constitutional
scrutiny constitutes a malleable, ad hoc test. This section concludes
that the norm of controlling police discretion can do a better job
than the "reasonable expectations of privacy" model currently em-
ployed by the Court. Second, I examine the Court's automobile
search doctrine. Here, I conclude that car search law is based on the
practical concerns of the police and is divorced from the Fourth
Amendment's ultimate purpose of restraining police discretion.
I. WHAT CAN FOURTH AMEN)MENTr DOCTRINE LFAR-N FROM THE
MOST CRITICAL COMPONENI OF THE VAGUENESS CASES?
A. Controlling Police Discretion is a Legitimate Constitutional Norm
Morales is certainly "a major decision bearing on the problem of
police discretion."2" Although it was a fractured ruling, six of the Jus-
Hill, supra note 24, at 1306. The following discussion is not intended to be an exhausti v
analysis of the Court's vagueness cases. Instead, it takes the ruling in Morales as a point of de-
parture for the Court's current view of the vagueness doctrine as it applies to criminal statutes.
Specifically, although there was no majority opinion in Morals, sixJustices did agree that Chi-
cago's ordinance was unconstitutional because it failed to control police discretion. Thus,
whatever else can be said about Morales and vagueness law generally, a majority of the Court
now believes that a critical element of vagueness doctrine is the requirement of minimal guide-
lines to control police discretion. For more detailed analysis of vagueness law and its impact on
modem criminal justice issues, see generally Anthony G. Amsterdam. Note. The Vind-for.
Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Courn, 109 U. PA. L REV. 67 (1960); Robert Batey, Vagueness and
the Construction of CriminalStatutes-BalaneingAcs, 51VA.J. SoC. POL'Y& L 1 (1997); Michael K.
Browne, Current Public Law and Policy Issues: Loitering Laws: Does Beng 'Tough on Crrue"Justify the
City of Minneapolis' Use of a Vague and Broadly Constructed Ordinance, Mch Crnsnalne Our
Thoughts in Violation of the FTrst Amendment?, 20 HAI-MUNEJ. P11B. L & POL 147 (1998); David
Cole, Foreword. Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidera A Response to the New Chnymal Justhe
Scholarship, 87 GEO. LJ. 1059 (1999); Bernard E. Harcourt. Rfletasng on the Subjet: A Cntique of
the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken li~ndows Theory, and Order..Mantenance Poik-
ingNaew York Styl 97 MICH. L REv. 291 (1998); Hill, supra note 24;John Calin Jeffries.Jr., Le-
galty, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 \'L L REV. 189 (1985); Kahan &
Meares, supra note 24; Livingston, Gang Loitering, supra note 14; Debra Liingston, Police Dscre-
tion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the Xew Policng, 97 COLUM. L
REv. 551 (1997) [hereinafter Livingston, Police Disarlion]; Tracey L Meares & Dan M. Kafan,
The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking. A Critique of Chicago v. Morales. 1998 U. Cli. LEGAL
F. 197; Robert C. Post, Reconceptualizing Vragueness: Legal Rules and Saal Orders, 82 C.L L REV.
491 (1994); Dorothy E. Roberts, supra note 24.
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tices did agree on one crucial point: the Constitution requires that
criminal statutes provide police officers with minimal standards and
clear criteria for enforcing them. These Justices concluded that the
Chicago ordinance violated the vagueness doctrine for three related
reasons. First, the ordinance contained no criteria or clear standards
to guide officers in enforcing the law. Second, the broad scope of the
ordinance covered a substantial amount of innocent behavior. Fi-
nally, because the ordinance lacked clear standards and covered "a
broad range of innocent conduct, 2 6 the ordinance invited subjective
judgments by officers and did nothing to discourage arbitrary and bi-
ased enforcement by the officer in the field.
Although the law may have provided sufficient notice to citizens
to avoid arrest, these three concerns were sufficient to invalidate Chi-
cago's ordinance. Moreover, the Morales majority voided the ordi-
nance without having to conclude that the behavior targeted by the
law-loitering for innocent purposes-was constitutionally protected
conduct.27 Lastly, the city's legitimate interest in eliminating or re-
straining the criminal aspects of street gang activity was not enough
to persuade the Court to put aside whatever concerns it might harbor
about police discretion to allow Chicago the means necessary "'to
preserve the city's streets and other public places so that the public
may use such places without fear."28- If the Court's concerns about
broad police discretion were enough to override Chicago's legitimate
law enforcement interests in these circumstances, then the principle
of requiring minimal guidelines to control police authority must be a
particularly important constitutional norm.
Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court concluded that the ordi-
nance violated the Constitution because it provided no guidelines re-
garding enforcement.& Justice Stevens was unpersuaded by the City's
arguments that the ordinance sufficiently limited police discretion."
Although the ordinance did not apply to persons who were moving,
26 Morales, 527 U.S. at 69 (Kennedy,J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
See id. at 53. The Court rejected respondents' Free Speech argument, because "[t]he or-
dinance does not prohibit speech .... [Ilt is also clear that it does not prohibit any form of
conduct that is apparently intended to convey a message." Id. However, a plurality of the Court
suggested that the ordinance might infringe the freedom of movement protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 52 (leaving undecided whether the im-
pact of the ordinance would support a facial challenge under the overbreadth doctrine).
28 Id. at 47 (quoting Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 58 (Ill. 1997) (quoting CfIiCAGO,
ILL., CODE § 8-4-015 (June 17, 1992))).
29 Vagueness doctrine is rooted in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The classic treatment of vagueness doctrine is Professor Anthony Amsterdam's
student note. SeeAmsterdam, supra note 25.
30 The City claimed that the ordinance restrained police discretion in three ways.
First, it does not permit the officer to issue a dispersal order to anyone who is moving
along or who has an apparent purpose. Second, it does not permit an arrest if individu-
als obey a dispersal order. Third, no order can issue unless the officer reasonably be-
lieves that one of the loiterers is a member of a criminal street gang.
Morales, 527 U.S. at 61.
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that limitation on an officer's discretion merely begged the question
of "how much discretion the police enjoy in deciding which station-
ary persons to disperse under the ordinance."' Nor -as Justice Stev-
ens convinced that police discretion would be checked by the fact
that no dispersal order could issue unless a group of loiterers con-
tained a gang member and that no loiterer could be arrested unless
he or she disobeyed the dispersal order. According to Justice Stev-
ens, the latter requirement "does not provide an), guidance to the of-
ficer deciding whether such an order should issue. '" And the re-
quirement that a group of loiterers contain a gang member did not
diminish the broad reach of the ordinance: "friends, relatives, teach-
ers, counselors, or even total strangers might unwittingly engage in
forbidden loitering if they happen to engage in idle conversation
with a gang member. "
3
Justice O'Connor also highlighted the lack of standards within the
ordinance. According to Justice O'Connor, the ordinance "fails to
provide police with any standard by which they can judge whether an
individual has an 'apparent purpose.' Indeed, because any person
standing on the street has a general 'purpose'-even if it is simply to
stand-the ordinance permits police officers to choose which pur-
poses are pennissible" The ordinance did not require any threat to
the public peace; simply presence with a gang member %%-as enough.
The constitutional vice here was plain: any person standing with a
gang member in a public place can be ordered to disperse at the
whim of any Chicago police officer.35
Justice Breyer, who joined Justice O'Connor's concurrence, w Tote
a separate opinion that emphasized both the scope of the ordi-
nance's reach and the absence of standards for officers to apply.3
ForJustice Breyer, "the ordinance violates the Constitution because it
delegates too much discretion to a police officer to decide whom to
order to move on, and in what circumstances."" Thus, "[t]he ordi-
nance is unconstitutional, not because a policeman applied this dis-
cretion wisely or poorly in a particular case, but rather because the
policeman enjoys too much discretion in eveiy case.
" ,
31 Id at 61-62 (foomote omitted).
S2 Id. at 62.
3d 1& at 63.
31 Id at 66 (O'ConnorJ., concurring in part and concurring in thejudgment).
S Id
InJustice Breyer's view, the ordinance's two limitations did not check police discretion.
The limitation that a group of loiterers contain a gang member did not narrow the law's reach
because non-gang members could still be ordered to disperse. The limitation that a person
must remain in public "with no apparent purpose," according to Justice Brevr, %%as 'not a limi-
tation at all." Id. at 70 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). This
part of the ordinance invites subjective judgment by officers regarding the purpose of those
remaining in a public place. Iet
Id at 71.
mid
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The combined statements and conclusions of the Justices compris-
ing the Morales majority indicate that a penal statute may be declared
unconstitutional if it does not provide "sufficient minimal standards
to guide law enforcement officers." 9 This aspect of Morales has been
severely criticized for doing "more harm than good to the project of
placing reasonable constraints on police."4 0 Professor Alfred Hill, for
example, believes Morales "has disquieting implications."'" Professor
Hill argues that if a criminal statute provides sufficient notice to a
citizen of what constitutes an offense, then that notice is sufficient to
guide the police. "[A] statute that sufficiently defines the offense was
traditionally thought by the Court to furnish adequate guidance to
the police., 42 According to Professor Hill, the principle upheld in
Morales is flawed for at least two other reasons. First, he claims Mora-
les entrenches an unworkable rule because the issue of whether a law
grants too much discretion to the police "would have to be decided
from case to case on what could only be a subjective basis."43 Second,
he asserts that the principle affirmed in Morales "lacks a firm founda-
44tion" in the Court's prior vagueness cases.
Professor Hill's criticism of Morales is unpersuasive. He believes
that if a statute gives sufficient notice of what constitutes an offense,
that is enough to satisfy vagueness concerns "- Professor Hill too eas-
ily dismisses the constitutional vice inherent in a statute that grants
broad police discretion. Like the "fair notice" norm, restraining po-
lice discretion promotes "rule of law" values.46 Providing one expla-
nation of the interests served by "rule of law" values, Professor John
Jeffries writes:
The rule of law signifies the constraint of arbitrariness in the exercise of
government power. In the context of the penal law, it means that the
agencies of official coercion should, to the extent feasible, be guided by
rules-that is, by openly acknowledged, relatively stable, and generally
applicable statements of prescribed conduct. The evils to be retarded are
caprice and whim, the misuse of government power for private ends, and
the unacknowledged reliance on illegitimate criteria of selection. The
goals to be advanced are regularity and evenhandedness in the admini-
59 Id. at 43 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 72
(Breyer,J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).40 ..
41 Livingston, Gang Loitering, supra note 14, at 145.




45 Id. ("[A] statute that sufficiently defines the offense was traditionally thought by the Court
to furnish adequate guidance to the police. If the police engaged in misconduct anyway, it was
not deemed to be for lack of guidance in the statute.").
46 See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional Restrictions on the Punishment of Crimes of
Status, Crimes of General Obnoxiousness, Crimes of Displeasing Police Offices, and the Like, 3 CRIm. L.
BuLL. 205, 221 (1967) ("[A] vague statute fundamentally affronts the rule of law embodied in
the Due Process Clause by permitting and encouraging more or less arbitrary and erratic arrests
and convictions.").
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stration ofjustice and accountability in the use of government power."
The interests described by Professor Jeffries are pertinent and ap-
propriate criteria for determining the constitutionality of Chicago's
ordinance. Indeed, judicial scrutiny of the type of police power and
discretion authorized by Chicago's ordinance is critical precisely be-
cause enforcement of that statute depended upon the subjective
judgments of police officers. In this context:
The power to define a vague law is effectively left to those who enforce it,
and those who enforce the penal law characteristically operate in settings
of secrecy and informality, often punctuated by a sense of emergency,
and rarely constrained by self-conscious generalization of standards. In
such circumstances, the wholesale delegation of discretion naturally in-
vites its abuse, and an important first step in constraining that discretion
is the invalidation of indefinite laws.4"
Chicago's ordinance gave police the power to order any person
standing in public with a suspected gang member to "move on. '
Even assuming that Chicago's ordinance gave fair notice of what con-
stituted the criminal offense (i.e. refusing an officer's dispersal or-
der), the ordinance still gave officers unguided discretion to order
people, who are otherwise violating no law, to leave a public place.
Thus, Professor Hill's conclusion that a statute that gives adequate
notice to the offender also gives adequate guidance to the police, fails
to address the potential for arbitrary and discriminatory law en-
forcement. Professor Hill's theory of vagueness would leave intact a
statute that provides adequate notice of an offense but no criteria for
restraining police discretion to order othenise law-abiding people
off the streets. Thirty-five years ago, the Court adamantly declared
that the Constitution would not tolerate such a law.!.
Professor Hill's other criticism of Morales, that the ruling "lacks a
firm foundation," is misplaced."' The result in Morales is neither sur-
prising, nor without foundation, in light of Kolender v. Lawson."2 In
4
7 Jeffiies, supra note 25, at 212.
48 Id at 215.
4 In an attempt to limit arbitrary enforcement of the ordinance, the Chicago Police DL-
partnent effectuated General Order 924, which confined enforcement to sworn 'members of
the gang crime section" and limited enforcement to certain 'designated areas" of the city,
which were not released to the public. See Morales, 527 U.S. at 48.
so See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965). This casw imolhed an ordi-
nance that made it unlawfful "for any person to stand or loiter upon any street or sidewalk...
after having been requested by any police officer to move on." Id. at 8 (quoting BIRMINGM40M,
ALA., GEN. CIy CODE § 1142 (1944) amended by Ordinance 1436-F). The Court held that
"[l]iterally read ... this ordinance says that a person may stand on a public sidewalk in Br-
minghamn only at the whim of any police officer of that city. The cont ultonal vice of so broad a
provisim needs no demonstroion." Id. at 90 (emphasis added). Birmingham's ordinance was not
invalidated on free speech grounds, "although First-Amendment issues lurked in the record."
Amsterdam, supra note 46, at 222.
51 Hill, supra note 24, at 1307.
52 461 U.S. 352 (1983). Professor Hill is not a fan of Klvide, either. See Hill. supra note 24,
at 1302-06. Professor Hill complains that, prior to Koknder "the Court had mentioned the role
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Kolender, the Court invalidated a California criminal statute "that re-
quire[d] persons who loiter or wander on the streets to provide a
'credible and reliable' identification and to account for their pres-
ence" when requested by a police officer who has reasonable suspi-
cion of criminal conduct to detain the person. 3 The Court con-
cluded that the law was too vague because it failed to "clarify what is
contemplated by the requirement that a suspect provide a 'credible
and reliable' identification."54 Writing for a seven-Justice majority,
Justice O'Connor described the California law as follows:
[It] contain[ed] no standard for determining what a suspect has to do in
order to satisfy the requirement to provide a 'credible and reliable' iden-
tification. As such, the statute vests virtually complete discretion in the
hands of the police to determine whether the suspect has satisfied the
statute and must be permitted to go on his way in the absence of prob-
able cause to arrest.55
As in Morales, the Court in Kolender was concerned about the po-
tential for discriminatory and arbitrary enforcement of a state stat-
ute.56 Indeed, when the rulings in Kolender and Morales are combined,
a solid majority of the Court is committed to restraining broad police
discretion, particularly when such discretion threatens the exercise of
civil liberties, like freedom of speech or the right to freedom of
movement.
57
of the vagueness doctrine in eliminating a potential for police abuse, but had never suggested
that the existence of such a potential was an independent basis for invalidating a statute." Id. at
1303 (footnote omitted). But he concedes that "[flor years the Court had spoken of the
vagueness doctrine as addressed to four concerns," including "avoidance of a potential for dis-
criminatory and arbitrary enforcement." Id at 1303-04 (footnote omitted). Indeed, in several
opinions pre-dating Kolender, the Court had stated that a vague law violates due process because
it authorizes the power for "arbitrary street enforcement, arbitrary arrest and similar harass-
ments" by police. Amsterdam, supra note 46, at 221 (citing cases). Thus, Professor Hill's objec-
tion that "Morales lacks a firm foundation" rests on the Court's willingness to rely upon criteria
other than fair notice grounds as a basis for ruling a penal statute unconstitutionally vague.
Although Morales and Kolender represent a change in emphasis, they fit comfortably with the
Court's past pronouncements regarding vagueness doctrine.
53 461 U.S. at 353 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 647(e) (West 1970)).
5 Id. at 353-54.
55 Id. at 358.
SeeJeffries, supra note 25, at 218 ("[The Kolender Court] focused on the right problem-
namely, the susceptibility of the law in question to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
That is the only rationale that plausibly supports this decision, and in my view it is the most pe r-
suasive justification for vagueness review generally.").
57 Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 ("[Under the California statute, an] individual, whom police may
think is suspicious but do not have probable cause to believe has committed a crime, is entitled
to continue to walk the public streets 'only at the whim of any police officer' who happens to
stop that individual under § 647(e). Our concern here is based upon the 'potential for arbi-
trarily suppressing First Amendment liberties .... In addition, § 647(e) implicates considera-
tion of the constitutional right to freedom of movement." (citations omitted)); Morales, 527
U.S. at 52-56 (explaining that the Court need not decide whether Chicago's ordinance had a
sufficient impact on the freedom of movement to justify facial invalidation under the over-
breadth doctrine); cf. Jeffries, supra note 25, at 217 ("The use of the vagueness doctrine to pro-
tect first amendment freedoms is,... closely linked to the rule of law: it presents, if you will, a
special case of the dangers of discretion.").
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Professor Hill worries that Morales "promises mischief as courts try
to determine the existence of a statutory potential for police abuse,"
and he contends that the "stability of the Morales rule is question-
able." Concededly, the Court must be careful to articulate workable
rules that can be understood and applied by the lower courts, legisla-
tors, and police officers alike. That being said, Professor Hill makes a
fair point when he notes that Morales does not provide a precise
measuring device for deciding when a statute allows too much police
discretion. However, the rulings in Morales and Kolender are unlikely
to grant judges a "veto" stamp for all types of criminal statutes. The
constitutional vice in both cases was naked police power. Imagine,
for a moment, the "mischief" for civil liberties if the Court had up-
held the statutes in Kolender and Morales, as Professor Hill suggests the
Court should have done. If the statute had been upheld in Kolender,
police officers could arrest a suspicious person who failed to provide
"credible and reliable" identification or failed to account for his pres-
ence to the extent that it would help in producing such identifica-
tion. "It takes little imagination to perceive that [this law] operates
simply as a charter of dictatorial power to the policeman.")9 As noted,
if Chicago's ordinance had been sustained, Chicago police officers
would be free to order individuals found standing on a city sidealk
or chatting on a park bench with a gang member to leave the area,
and they would have had the power to arrest anyone who disobeyed
their orders.r° "Most Americans no doubt would be offended by po-
lice orders to move along; they certainly would find it hard to see
their compliance with such orders as an exercise of liberty." '
Most importantly, the Court in Morales and Kolenderuwas well aware
of the potential that the challenged laws would be enforced in a ra-62
cially uneven manner. When police are given ide discretion to
wield power, selective and race-based law enforcement is likely, if not
Hill, supra note 24, at 1307.
5 Amsterdam, supra note 46, at 223.
60 See Aaron J. Mann, Casenote, A Pluralit' of the Supmne Courl .sseds a Due Pnxess Right To Do
Absolutely Nothing in City of Chicago v. Morales, 33 CREIGHTON L REV. 579, 629-30 (2000) (as-
serting that the Chicago ordinance unjustifiably authorizes a "standardicess si'eep" that 'grants
the police too much discretion and lends itself to arbitrary and discriminator) enforcement).
62 Roberts, supra note 24, at 812.
See Brief of Respondents 30-32, Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (No. 97-1121);
Brief of Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety, CL al. 26-28, Chicago v. Morales. 527 L'S. 41
(1999) (No. 97-1121); see also Roberts, supra note 24, at 780 ('"Although this constitutional flaw
can be explained in race-neutral terms, in Chicago it resulted in a particular racial injur); the
gang-loitering law disproportionately violated the rights of Black and Latino citizens." (foot-
note omitted)). In Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983), Edward Lawson, an economically
successful, well-educated, innocent black man ims repeatedly hassled, questioned. detained,
and arrested by police officers in southern California. 1%lien police officers were harassing him,
Lawson was a thirty-ix year old San Francisco business consultant who wore his hair in dread-
locks. Lawson was detained or arrested fifteen times by the police while ialking late at night in
white neighborhoods in San Diego. See Dan Stormer & Paul Berstein, The !mpad of Kolender v.
Lawson on LawEnforcement and Minoity Group 12 I-LSTINGS CONST. LQ. 105, 105 (1 4).
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inevitable-particularly when officers have multiple encounters with
racial and ethnic minorities. 63 The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause was specifically designed to address racial discrimi-
nation by state actors. But nothing in the Constitution precludes the
Court from developing other legal norms to address the evils of selec-
tive and arbitrary law enforcement that do not rise to the level pro-
hibited by the Court's equal protection cases. Of course, as an ab-
stract matter, few people would want to live in a society where police
officers had no discretion regarding law enforcement. Thus, "[e]very
legal system will have some resort to discretion."' But acknowledging
the reality that our legal regime tolerates different levels of discretion
by government officers should not prevent the Court from recogniz-
ing another reality of our legal regime: racial bias. In Morales and
Kolender, the Court properly acted to prevent the evils of racial and
other forms of discrimination that inevitably emerge when police of-
ficers are given unchecked discretion to enforce the law. When the
Court acts to counter selective and arbitrary police enforcement, it
promotes rule-of-law values:
Greater conformity to the rule of law discourages resort to illegitimate
criteria of selection and enhances our ability to discover and redress such
abuses when they occur. Lesser adherence to that ideal facilitates abusive
63 SeeCole, supra note 25, at 1083 ("The problem with discretionary authority--and the need
for judicial control-is that discretion permits law enforcement to target those whose com-
plaints are least likely to be heard by the rest of the community. This is true whether the com-
munity is heterogeneous or homogeneous."); Roberts, supra note 24, at 786 ("The discrimina-
tory impact of discretion is magnified tremendously by laws that leave not only the
determination of suspicion but the very definition of offending conduct almost entirely to an
officer's judgment."). The recent reports of the New Jersey and New York Attorneys General
reveal the nexus between discretionary police authority and race-based law enforcement:
Police officers necessarily exercise considerable discretion in performing their sworn du-
ties. This is especially true in the context of highway patrol .... [T] he legitimate criteria
for selecting vehicles in these circumstances have never been clearly spelled out in writ-
ten standard operating procedures or formal training curricula. Rather, the criteria
used by troopers in exercising their discretion have been developed in an ad hoc fashion
over the years, passed on through informal 'coaching,' tempered by each trooper's own
experience and enforcement priorities, and strongly influenced by an official policy to
reward troopers who find major drug shipments. This situation may invite both inten-
tional and unintentional abuse and provides a management environment that allows the
use of stereotypes to go undetected.
PETER VERNIERO & PAUL H. ZOUBEK, A-rrORNEY GEN. OF N.J., INTERIM REPORT OF THE STATE
POLICE REVIEW TEAM REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF RACIAL PROFILING 11-12 (Apr. 20, 1999)
available at http://wv.state.nj.us/lps/intm_419.pdf; see also id. at 30-31; OFFICE OF "l-E N.Y.
STATE ATTORNEY GEN. ELIOT SPITZER, THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT'S "STOP &
FRISK" PRACTICES (1999) (detailing the impact of the New York City police department's use of
stop and frisk practices and other low-visibility tactics on the everyday lives of minority citizens;
explaining why such practices have caused tension between the police and the minority coin-
munities) available at http://wv.oag.state.ny.us/press/reports/stop frisk/stop-frisk.html.
Jeffries, supra note 25, at 213; cf KENNETH CULP DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 119 (1975)
("Possibly most important of all is the idea that rulemaking can reduce injustice by cutting out
unnecessary discretion, which is one of the prime sources of injustice. Necessary discretion must
be preserved, including especially the needed individualizing-adapting of rules to the unique
facts of each case." (emphasis added)).
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and discriminatory law enforcement and makes that evil more difflicult to
identify and control. Thus, the "worst case" breakdown of the nile of law
is not random whim or caprice but hidden bias and prejudice. And the
single most potent concern at issue here is not an abstract interest in the
postulates of a just legal order but a specific commiunent to end dis-
crimination based on race or ethnicity. In the specific historical context
in which we live, inhibiting racial discrimination in law enforcement is
very much a part of what the rule of law is all about."
Finally, one could imagine a variation of Chicago's ordinance that
applied to everyone. If that hypothetical ordinance were enforced
throughout the city, the opportunities for arbitrary or discretionary
enforcement might diminish. But that ordinance would never be en-
acted, or if it were enacted, would never be enforced, because even-
handed enforcement would be politically imprudent. Certainly, po-
lice discretion will be restrained if a law is enforced against
everyone.i But if government is forced to target everyone in order to
reach a few, the political process will prevent the government from
targeting anyone. Chicago's gang congregation ordinance operated
in the opposite direction. Governmental power ws directed at a
small group and left the majority of the population tnaffected.
When this type of law is enacted, discretionary police atthority per-
Jeffries, supra note 25, at 213-14. Professor Debra Livingston has written extetsnel oil
the need for police discretion and contends that the vagueness doctrine should be refonnu-
lated to recognize changes in modem policing strategies. See Livingston. Polie Dtc-Whon. supra
note 25. Most recently, she argues that the assumption that judges can constrain capricious
police enforcement---"an assumption expressed quite dearly in .Maralr?-is "significandt less
plausible" when applied to modem laws like Chicago's ordinance. Livingston, Gang lamtng.
supra note 14, at 166. In support of her thesis, Livingston notes that modern legal regimes
.create substantial opportunities for police arbitrariness that do not raise traditional vagueness
concerns." Id. According to Livingston, those opportunities exist in three contexts: (1)
"broad, but clear lawvs--such as [a] juvenile curfew[]" statute; (2) "narow and specific. but
commonly violated, low-level statutes and ordinances;" and (3) the Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, which "vests police with a significant degree ofstreet-leel discretion ...." IdL I
do not disagree with Professor Livingston's claim that other parts of the legal svstem create op-
portunities for police abuse that are beyond the reach of the agueness doctrine. Indeed, a ma-
jor premise of this article is that the Court's Fourth Amendment cases provide the me1ans for
arbitrary police power. I do, however, strongly disagree with Professor Livungston's proposal
that courts employ a "reasonableness" analysis when deciding vagueness questions. &,e id. at
195-98 ("Simply stated, courts addressing difficult vagueness questions should consider %%hether
the exercise of police discretion contemplated in challenged public order legislation suli take
place under conditions that provide reasonable assurances that the relevant police depuunent
will be accountable for the way in which it employs this discretion .... Like all tests premised
on reasonableness, the one articulated here will permit many factors to be considered."). A
vagueness doctrine based on "reasonableness" will produce the same degree of discreuonuan
and arbitrary police power that is currently authorized by Fourth Amendment doctrine.
Cf. SilasJ. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman. The Fourth Actirunam: as Cogaldutional
Thaoy, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 93-94 (1988) (describing the appropriateness of judicial intersention
where the political process fails to value interests of politically less powerful groups and explain-
ing thatjudicial intervention is needed "to assure that tie tradeoff between privacs and law en-
forcement is that which a hypothetical political system would strike if eveurone's interests isere
equally represented"); Erik G. Luna, Sovereign4t and Suspicion, 48 DUKE L.J. 787. 80-I18 i l 9)
(describing an "anti-discrimination" model of Fourth Amendment thcor).
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mits the state to pick and choose persons to subject to governmental
power and diminishes regularity and accountability by state actors.
In sum, the norm of controlling police discretion is a legitimate
constitutional principle when applied to overturn statutes like those
involved in Morales and Kolender. Both cases involved penal statutes
that afforded police substantial discretionary power to enforce the
law, without providing concrete standards to guide officers or restrain
their authority. Concededly, the constitutional rule adopted in Mora-
les does not explain when a statute gives too much discretion to the
police. We do know, however, that the ordinance at issue in Morales
provided no means to restrain police power and gave officers a po-
tent measure to enforce the criminal law in a selective and arbitrary
manner. When the norm of controlling police discretion is applied
in this setting, it properly advances rule-of-law interests of "regularity
and evenhandedness in the administration ofjustice and accountabil-
ity in the use of government power."
67
B. The Norm of Controlling Police Discretion is Consistent
with the Fourth Amendment
Morales illustrates that the norm of controlling police discretion is
an important feature of vagueness doctrine. That being true, one
could properly ask whether the norm of restraining police discre-
tionary power can, or should, be applied in other constitutional con-
texts.
Currently, Fourth Amendment law is controlled by a "reasonable-
ness" model. For the modem Court, the main object of the Amend-
ment is reasonable police behavior when conducting searches and
seizures. Reasonableness is typically determined by balancing the
government's interest in effective law enforcement against the indi-
vidual's privacy and liberty interests."s There are compelling reasons
why the norm of controlling police discretion, rather than a reason-
ableness norm, is an appropriate tool for judging the legality of po-
lice searches and seizures.6 ' First, to the extent that history influences
67 Jeffries, supra note 25, at 212.
68 See, e.g., Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 (1990) ("Our cases show that in determining
reasonableness, we have balanced the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment inter-
ests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests." (citations omitted)); Wyoming
v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-303 (1999) (finding "that the balancing of the relative interests
weighs decidedly in favor of allowing searches of a passenger's belongings").
Of course, a "reasonableness" model for deciding search and seizure cases is consistent
with the literal language of the Fourth Amendment, which grants to the People, a right "to be
secure ... against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Nor does a
"reasonableness" model necessarily preclude judicial efforts to control police discretion. See
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Al-
though the Fourth Amendment does not explicitly impose the requirement of a warrant, it is of
course textually possible to consider that implicit within the requirement of reasonableness.");
see also Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment "Reasonableness, "98 COLUM.
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constitutional decision making, the norm of restraining police discre-
tion is consistent, as a reasonableness model is not TM ith the "larger
purpose" that the Framers had in mind when the), adopted the
Fourth Amendment.' Second, even if historical concerns are put
aside, the norm of controlling police discretion is a superior analyti-
cal tool to the Court's reasonableness model. The Court's reason-
ableness approach, which is applied in a variety of settings, is an ad
hoc analysis that often lacks standards and rarely is applied ith an
underlying vision in mind. When applied to search and seizure cases,
the norm of controlling police discretion can avoid the standardless
decision-making inherent in the reasonableness model. For example,
L. REv. 1642 (1998) (proposing a "reasonableness" model that includes greater subsutuise and
procedural safeguards in Fourth Amendment analysis); Christopher Slobogin. The llbrtd Hithout
a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L RE. 1, 8-38 (1991) (arguing that tie "reasonableness" of a
search or seizure should be assessed by balancing the state and individual interests and conclud-
ing that government officers be required to obtain third party authorization prior to any non-
emergency search or seizure). Conversely, the "reasonableness" model typically emplo~ed by
the modem Court is a balancing process "in which the judicial thumb apparenty will be
planted firmly on the law-enforcement side of the scales." United States v. Sharpe. 470 U.S.
675, 720 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted); see also JOSHUA DRE.ER,
UNDERSTANDING CRLMiNAL LxW § 11.01 [C], at 165 (2d ed. 1995) ('Language announcing a
broad warrant requirement is now almost exclusively found in dissenting opinions. The clear
and unmistakable trend of the law is toward the 'reasonableness' clause."). When 'balancing"
becomes the touchstone of constitutional analysis, the Justices' personal vicui may ,affect the
outcome of certain cases. Cf. Mark Tushnet, Justice Len'is F. Pow,) and theJunsprudene of Cen-
trim, 93 MicH. L REv. 1854, 1877-78 (1995) (WhIien one seeks to balance interests, tie result is
likely to be distorted to the extent that one systematically undervalues the interests on one side
of the balance while giving full weight to the interests on the oilier side."). Rather than control-
ling police discretion, the modem Court's "reasonableness" model often expands police discre-
tion and authority. In other places, I have argued that the underlying vision of tie Fourth
Amendment is controlling police discretionary power. Se, e.g., Trace' Maclin, lnforr.ants and
the Fourth Amendment, 74 WASH. U. LQ. 573, 584-85 (1996) [hereinafter Maclin, Infornlts];
Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Andument, 35 Wsl. & %L%.Ry L RE . 197, 201,
228-29 (1993); Tracey Maclin, I11hen the Cure for the Fourth Amndment is lMa than the Disease. 68
S. CA_ L. REV. 1, 24-25 (1994). See also WilliamJ. Mertens, The Fourth Arwridrruntt and the Control
of Police Discretion, 17 U. MICH.J.L. REFOR.% 551, 553 (1984) (arguing that the Fourth Amend-
ment "performs a discretion control function").
Io See Thomas Y. Davies, Recmering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MiCit. L REv. 547, 591-
600 (1999). Detailing the two-fold inconsistency between the Framers' intent and the modem
Court's reasonableness analysis, Professor Davies writes:
The first is the [Framers'] widespread opposition to allowing officers to exercise discre-
tionary search authority.... That opposition is inconsistent ivith the use of a relativistic
reasonableness standard, which would have facilitated officers' discretion to initiate in-
trusions. The second fact is a silence: reasonableness was not used as a standard for as-
sessing searches or arrests in framing-era legal sources, and there is also no persuasive
evidence of the use of any such standard during the framing of tie state or federal con-
stitutional provisions.
Id. at 591.
71 Id. at 556 (arguing against a return to the literal, original understandings of the Framers
regarding the Fourth Amendment because that "'ould subvert the larger purpose for which tie
Framers adopted the text; namely to curb the exercise of discretionary authority by officers");
Morgan Cloud, Searching Through Histoi;" Scarching for Histosy 63 U. Cit. L REv. 1707, 1729
(1996) ("[T]he Framers acted to eliminate search and seizure methods that permitted the arbi-
trary exercise of discretion and were conducted without good cause, whether or not ,rrants
were employed." (footnote omitted)).
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if restraining police discretion were the touchstone of Fourth
Amendment law, suspicionless police searches and seizures would not
be permitted. Finally, if the Court were to substitute the norm of
controlling police discretion in place of its current reasonableness
model, there is the possibility that Fourth Amendment cases would
have an identifiable theme.
1. The Relevance of History forFourth Amendment Norms
Mining constitutional norms from the Fourth Amendment's
complex history can be a problematic endeavor. As one historian
pointed out, the text of the Amendment "mingles ambiguous and
precise language, for it forbids all types of unreasonable searches and
seizures but identifies only one unreasonable type and that one only
implicitly. 72  Moreover, the historical background surrounding the
Amendment's development and adoption "did not illuminate all as-
pects of the Fourth Amendment equally, nor did [it] explain all of its
original meaning. Th [e] historical documents, however, did explain
a great deal of that meaning and were indispensable to its under-
standing."T Despite the density of the Amendment's history and the
uncertainty of its text, some Justices argue that the Framers intended
a "reasonableness" requirement for all searches and seizures.7 4 And
some of these Justices insist that the Amendment's requirement of
reasonableness "affords the protection that the common law af-
forded."75 This manner of legal history will not advance Fourth
WilliamJ. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning, 602-1791, at
ci (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School) (footnote omitted).
7 Id. at ciii.
74 See, e.g., Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 563 (1999) (Thomas, J.) (stating that the proper
analysis to construe the Fourth Amendment is primarily by the reasonableness of the search at
the time of the Amendment's adoption); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581 (1991)
(Scalia,J., concurring) ("The Fourth Amendment does not by its terms require a prior warrant
for searches and seizures; it merely prohibits searches and seizures that are 'unreasonable.'");
Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 438 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that by
"emphasizing the warrant requirement over the reasonableness of the search the Court has
'stood the fourth amendment on its head' from a historical standpoint" (quoting Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 492 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)); Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 620 (1980) (White, J., dissenting) ("Our cases establish that the ultimate test under
the Fourth Amendment is one of 'reasonableness.'"); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 772-73
(1969) (White, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that "[t]he [Fourth] Amendment does not pro-
scribe 'warrantless searches' but instead it proscribes 'unreasonable searches").
7 California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 583 (1991) (ScaliaJ., concurring). For an excellent
critique ofJustice Scalia's view that, when applying the Fourth Amendment, judges should con-
sider whether the challenged police conduct "was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure
under the common law when the Amendment was framed," Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S.
295, 299 (1999), see David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUNI. L.
REV. 1739 (2000). Professor Sklansky argues that "[n]either the text nor the background of the
Fourth Amendment suggests it aims merely to codify eighteenth-century rules of search and
seizure." Id. at 1744. According to Professor Sklansky, "the Framers' eighteenth-century ra-
tionalism offers little basis for concluding that they intended the opening clause of the Fourth
Amendment to constitutionalize the then-existing rules of search and seizure. The common
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Amendment interests, nor, incidentally, the intent of the Framers.
As an initial matter, it is highly unlikely that the Framers intended
the Fourth Amendment to be interpreted in the ad hoc manner fa-
vored by the modem Court. Professor Thomas Davies's detailed
scholarship on the history of the Amendment indicates that the
Framers had no intention of creating or adopting the reasonableness
analysis embraced by the Court for judging the legality of govern-
mental searches and seizures. According to Professor Davies, the
precise aim of the Framers was straightfon-ard and narrow- to forbid
legislation that would authorize the use of general warrants to in-
trude into private homes."6 More importantly, Professor Davies con-
cludes that the reasonableness model of the modem Court "is espe-
cially distant from the Framers' meaning."" A "reasonableness"
construction of the Fourth Amendment "runs afoul of two historical
facts." 8 First, during the period immediately preceding adoption of
the state and federal constitutional provisions on search and seizure,
opposition to discretionary search authority was pervasive in the
colonies.i This opposition manifested itself in vigorous condemna-
tion of general warrants and writs of assistance. According to Davies,
this "opposition is inconsistent with the use of a relativistic reason-
ableness standard, which would have facilitated officers' discretion to
initiate intrusions."0 The second historical fact that weakens the like-
lihood that the Framers intended to adopt reasonableness as the
touchstone for Fourth Amendment analysis is their silence. "' Accord-
law revered by the Framers-the common law they thought timeless ad uniersal-resided in
fundamental principles, not injudicial precedents and statutory prescriptions.' Il at 1790.
76 As explained by Professor Davies:
The historical record indicates that the Framers perceived the threat to the right to be
secure more precisely than we do today. They did not have a diffuse concern about the
security of person and house-the commonaw rules regarding search and arrest
authority provided sufficient protection against unjustified intrusions. Instead, they, were
concerned about a specific vulnerability in the protections provided by te common law-
they were concerned that legislation might make general wvarrants legal in the future.
and thus undermine the right of security in person and house. Thus, the Framers
adopted constitutional search and seizure provisions vxith the precise aim of ensuring the
protection of person and house by prohibiting legislative approval of general ,arrants.
Davies, supra note 70, at 590.
,7 I& at 736.
7I8d. at 591.
Id. at 576-89. For other historical works describing colonial reaction to dascreionary
searches and seizures, see generally Cuddihy, supra note 72, at 459-527, 757-825; William Cud-
dihy & B. Carmon Hardy, A Man's House Was Not His Castle: Origis of the Fourth Arr.ndrr-nt to the
United States Constitution, 37 WM. & MARY Q. 371 (1980); O.M. Dickerson. Iltsi of sutance as a
Cause of the Revolution, in THE ERA OF THE AMERICAN REVOLLrrON (Richard B. Morris ed.. 1939);
Joseph Frese, Writs of Assistance in the American Colonies (1951) (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Harvard University); JOSIAH QUINCY; REPORTS OF C.SES ARG'ED AND ADJUDGED IN THE
SUPERIOR COURT OFJUDICATURE OF THE PROVIDENCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 1761-1772. app.l
at 395-540 (1865) (Horace Gray's notes); M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OFA.SISTANCE C.SE (1978).
so Davies, supra note 70, at 591.
s1 Id. ("[R]easonableness w%,as not used as a standard for assessing searches or arrests in fram-
ing-era legal sources, and there is also no persuasive evidence of the use of any such standard
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ing to Davies's research, the few isolated references to "unreasonable
searches and seizures" do not provide convincing evidence that the
Framers intended open-ended reasonableness to be the guiding
principle for deciding the legality of searches and seizures." When
the Framers spoke of the privacy and security of a man's castle and
condemned the evils they experienced with British customs searches,
they had a specific target in mind: forcible intrusions into private
homes authorized by general warrants and writs of assistance.8"
Having this history in mind, can a legal norm be extracted from
the Fourth Amendment's origins to guide modern interpretation of
search and seizure law? I believe that the norm of controlling police
discretion accurately captures the central meaning of the Fourth
Amendment."4 Indeed, the norm of restraining discretionary police
power is the overriding principle that emerges when one focuses on
the Amendment's underlying purpose. In the Framers' era, that
purpose was "controlling the discretion of government officials to in-
vade the privacy and security of citizens, whether that discretion be
directed toward the homes and offices of political dissidents, illegal
smugglers, or ordinary criminals."05 Today that same purpose of con-
trolling discretionary authority can and should be applied to the
various types of police search and seizure conduct. 6 Furthermore,
during the framing of the state or federal constitutional provisions.").
82 Id. at 600. But cf Sklansky, supra note 75, at 1780 ("The term 'unreasonable'... almost
always meant in the late-eighteenth-century what it means today: contrary to soundjudgment,
inappropriate, or excessive. That is the usage suggested by dictionaries in use at the time. That
is also how the term was used in political rhetoric. In The Federalist Papers, for example, 'unrea-
sonable' means either excessive or implausible-it never means illegal or condemned by com-
mon-law courts." (footnotes omitted)).
83 See Cuddihy, supra note 72, at 1546-47 ("In 1787-88, commentors on the Constitution de-
nounced general warrants and searches not just because they were general but because they
abridged the security that houses afforded from unwelcome intrusion. That houses were castles
was the most recurrent theme of those commentaries."); see also Maclin, Informants, supra note
69, at 578 ("When the Fourth Amendment was adopted in 1791, the unreasonable searches and
seizures that preoccupied Americans primarily involved forcible intrusions into homes by offi-
cials under the authority of general warrants and writs of assistance." (citations omitted)).
Cf Cuddihy, supra note 72, at 1546 ("The concern with warrants, in short, embraced a
concern with houses, which encapsulated still deeper concerns. The amendment's opposition
to unreasonable intrusion, by warrant and without warrant, sprang from a popular opposition
to the surveillance and divulgement that intrusion made possible."); Davies, supra note 70, at
736 ("The Framers never meant to create a relativistic notion of 'reasonableness' as a global
standard for assessing warrantless intrusions by officers. Rather, they banned general warrants
in order to prevent the officer from exercising discretionary authority.... There is no reason to
think they meant for 'reasonableness' to be understood as a flexible, relativistic standard for the
exercise of discretionary authority." (footnote omitted)).
85 Maclin, Informants, supra note 69, at 585 n.53.
86 Cf Davies, supra note 70, at 747-48 (noting that "[t]he reality of deep change since the
framing means that the original meaning generally cannot directly speak to modern issues,"
and that pragmatically speaking, "the central issue in modern Fourth Amendment doctrine is
the degree to which it is possible and/or desirable to constrain discretionary police authority by
a regime of rules, or at least partial rules .... The issue is not whether we will allow any discre-
tionary police authority, but how much discretionary authority will be conferred and in what
circumstances." (footnote omitted)); David A. Harris, Car Wars, supra note 17, at 578 (1998)
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the constitutional norm of controlling police discretion, unlike a rea-
sonableness model, works in concert with specific goals that the
Framers contemplated when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.
The Framers "banned general warrants in order to prevent the officer
from exercising discretionary authority,"sT and the) "believed that
specific warrants provided significant protections against arbitrary in-
trusions. In sum, the Framers sought to control the power and dis-
cretion of law enforcement officers. To the extent that the Court
genuinely seeks to promote the underlying vision of the Fourth
Amendment, those aims are more likely to be achieved by utilizing
the norm of controlling police discretion as the touchstone of Fourth
Amendment analysis.8q
2. The Norm of Controlling Police Discretion
Prohibits Arbitra , Intrusions
Even if one believes that the Framers' intent should not dictate
the outcome of modem Fourth Amendment doctrine." the norm of
controlling police discretion remains superior to the Court's reason-
ableness model for deciding the legality of searches and seizures. As
noted earlier, the Court decides whether a challenged governmental
intrusion violates the Fourth Amendment by asking whether officials
have acted in a reasonable manner. This formula lacks content and
amounts to nothing more than an ad hcjudgment about the desir-
ability of certain intrusions. Consider, as one example, the Court's
resolution of an issue that affects millions of citizens: can police arbi-
("Police need discretion to do their work; indeed, it is impossible to imagine eliminating it.
The questions are how much discretion comports with the Fourth Amendment, and how this
discretion might be channeled most uisely." (footnote omitted)).
87 Davies, supra note 70, at 736.
Id- (footnote omitted).
See i&. at 736-37. Davies writes, "framing-era common law resisted the sort of discretionary
authority that 'reasonableness' analysis confers on modem officers. The modem notion of
'reasonableness' would have been distinctly ill suited to the Framers' concerns; it is such a soft.
subjective, contentless notion that it fosters and enhances, rather than curbs, discretionary
authority." Id (footnotes omitted).
90 See, ag., Houghton, 526 U.S. at 307 (BreyerJ., concurring) (expressing the "understanding
that history is meant to inform, but not automatically to deternine, the an er to a Fourth
Amendment question"); I WAYNE R. L-%FAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.1 (a). at 6 (3d ed. 1996)
(noting that reliance on the Framers' original intent "is of limited utility*); Anthony G. Amnster-
dam, Perspetives on theFourth Amendment, 58 MINLN. L REv. 349,401 (1974) (noting that techno-
logical advances, an expanding, urbanized population, and the "increased dangers of crime in
an automated age" prevent reliance on the Framers' view of what the Fourth Amendment %%m
specifically designed to accomplish; therefore, even if today's society "%anted to take exclusive
counsel of the framers on the problems of our time, we could not do so"); Carol S. Steiker, Sec-
ond Thoughts About First Principes, 107 HARV. L REv. 820. 823-24 (1994) (arguing that m inter-
pretation that focuses on the intent of the Framers ignores two crucial changes since the Fourth
Amendment was adopted: first, the development of the armed, quasi-military professional po-
lice force, and second, the "intensification of inter-racial conflict" within society and the various
ways "in which this conflict has intersected with law enforcement").
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trarily order a motorist out of a car during a routine traffic stop? In
1977, in Pennsylvania v. Mimms,9 1 the Court ruled that police officers
possessed unchecked authority to order drivers out of their vehicles
during routine traffic stops. Twenty years later the "other shoe" fell,
when Maryland v. Wilson extended the reasoning of Mimms to pas-
sengers, noting that the same officer-safety concerns that motivated
the result in Mimms also justified giving police absolute discretion to
order passengers out of cars during traffic stops.
The reasoning of Mimms and Wilson is sensible if constitutional
reasonableness is determined on an ad hoc basis. Police safety is both
a legitimate and weighty factor. Moreover, reasonable minds can cer-
tainly differ over whether a driver's or passenger's interest in remain-
ing in a car during a traffic stop should trump the interest of police
safety. The Court's balancing model is reasonable in the sense that
rational persons could reach the conclusion that the interest in offi-
cer safety outweighs the interest in protecting motorists from arbitrar-
ily being ordered to exit their cars. But this type of reasonableness
should not be equated with the constitutional reasonableness de-
manded by the Fourth Amendment because it permits arbitrary po-
lice intrusion. If the underlying vision of the Amendment is a distrust
of police discretion, then arbitrary police intrusions should never be
allowed. As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent in Mimns, "to elimi-
nate any requirement that an officer be able to explain the reasons
for his actions signals an abandonment of effective judicial supervi-
sion of this kind of seizure and leaves police discretion utterly without
limits."
93
The rulings in Mimms and Wilson are wrong for another reason.
In the real world, police departments and individual officers will not
exercise the authority conferred by these decisions constantly, or
even frequently. A policy of always ordering drivers and passengers
out of their cars would be politically unattractive and needlessly in-
convenient if applied to every motorist stopped for a traffic violation.
Instead, police officers will exercise this authority based on their indi-
vidual predilections. As Professor LaFave comments about Wilson,
"the likely impact of Wilson is not that all traffic stops passengers will
be ordered out of their vehicles as a matter of routine, but instead
that police will sometimes give such an order."94 That will mean that
certain drivers and passengers will be ordered out of their vehicles,
while the majority of motorists will not be subjected to this arbitrary
order. Because Mimms and Wilson confer an absolute authority to or-
der occupants of vehicles out of their cars during a traffic stop, not
only will judicial review of this practice be unavailable, it is "very pos-
91 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam).
519 U.S. 408 (1997).
93 Mimms, 434 U.S. at 122 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
94 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.5, at 79 (3d ed. Supp. 2000).
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sible that these decisions will be based on considerations having no
legitimate connection with any risk of harm to the officer.""' Thus,
Justice Kennedy did not exaggerate when he noted that the practical
effect of the authority conferred in Mimms and Wilson, when com-
bined with the discretion afforded by Mhren, puts "tens of millions of
[drivers and] passengers at risk of arbitrary control by the police."'
Finally, the judgments in Mimms and Wilson show that the Court is
incapable of applying its own "reasonableness" standard in a consis-
tent or good faith manner. As Justice Scalia's questions during oral
argument in Wilson revealed, the crux of the government's position
was that the Court not apply any reasonableness analysis to an exit or-
der directed at a passenger.- The government asked for, and re-
95 Id -
96Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. at 423 (Kennedy.j., dissenting). The "risk of arbiurv con-
trol" thatJustice Kennedy described will not be limited to the exit orders specificall approved
in Mimms and Vrdson. As is true ith most Fourth Amendment axioms articulated b Eie Court.
police officers will consistently push the reach of these rules and test the judiciars's %illingness
to limit police discretion. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 16U. 182 (1949) (Jackson. J..
dissenting) ("We must remember that die extent of any privilege of search mid seizure without
warrant which we sustain, the officers interpret and apply thenselves and %ill push to the
limit."). Police officers (or their legal advisors) have interpreted 3irni and li/Lan as grounds
not only to order motorists out of their vehicles, but also as authority to damn motorists inside
or outside their vehicles. See ag., Rogala v. District of Columbia, 161 F.3d 44 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(affirming the district court's finding that officers may order passengers to renain in a ichicle
during the administration of a field sobriety test, especially where the officer is alone or con-
cerned for his safety); United States v. Moorefield. I ll F.3d 10, 13 (3rd Cir. 1997) (finding that
officers may lawfully order passengers to remain in vehicles with their hands raised because
such an order is a "minimal intrusion on personal liberty'); Wilson v. State, 734 So.2d 1107 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (rejecting officers' argument that they may routinely order a passenger to
get back into a vehicle and remain inside for duration of traffic stop), cert. dented. 120 S. Ct.
1996 (2000); People v. Gonzalez, 704 N.E.2d 375 (I1. 1998) (holding that police may detain a
passenger who exits and attempts to leave the scene of a traffic stop. even absent reasonable
suspicion, but leaving open the question whether police may detain a passenger for the entire
duration of a traffic stop), cert. deniA, 120 S. CL 75 (1999); Tawdul v. State. 720 N.E.2d 1211
(Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that police may detain passengers who attempt to exit a laufull,
stopped vehicle until the officer has dispelled concerns for his safety), rdih' demed, 735 N.E.2d
226 (Ind. 2000); State v. Scimemi, No. 94-CA-58. 1995 WL 329031, at 03-4 (Ohio Ct. App. June
2, 1995) (holding that an officer may briefly detain mid order a passenger to remain in a %ehu-
cle during a traffic stop if the officer finds such an order necessary as a safety precaution, but
declining to address the permissible period of detention of passengers).
Cf. Harris, Car alirs, supra note 17, at 564 ("The operative parts of ( Iilson are nothing
but policyjudgments dressed up as principled judicial decisions.").
The following is an excerpt of some questions posed during oral arguments:
Question: General Reno, you want no reasonableness limitation on this. I suppose that
means that a police officer could stop a bus and say, evet)body off the bus. Or-)ou
know, does vehicle size come into it.
General Reno: Yes, Your Honor. That might be a more difficult question for the Court.
but-
Question: Well, not for you. You want no reasonableness limitation.
General Reno: Again, the bus situation can be an unknown situation for that officer.
and he needs the opportunity, under our position, to be able to size up the situation, to
determine and observe the people involved, and lie may determine that lie wishes them
to stay in or to exit. Police practices indicate that both are appropriate, depending on
the stage of the traffic stop and depending on die circumstances of die traffic stop. We
are submitting that under the-this Court's rule in Mirnrns, it is the persons seated in the
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ceived, the Court's approval to eliminate any requirement that a po-
lice officer explain why a motorist was ordered out of a vehicle during
a traffic stop. Judicial review of exit orders was abolished. After Wil-
son, police have the power to order motorists in and out of cars with-
out having to justify their actions to anyone. In a nation that prides
itself on the rule of law, this is a curious result. If controlling police
discretion were the touchstone of the Court's Fourth Amendment
analysis rather than "reasonableness," then millions of drivers and
passengers could not be seized solely on the arbitrary and unreview-
able judgment of a police officer. If officers were required to justify
these seizures, then the nation's motorists might be "more secure"
against unreasonable seizures while travelling the nation's roads and
highways.
3. The Norm of Controlling Police Discretion Should Guide
Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
Fourth Amendment law seems bewildering because the Court's
reasonableness model encourages subjective and haphazard results.
Consequently, criminal procedure scholars often deride the Court's
Fourth Amendment doctrine as unnecessarily confusing and dis-
jointed." Viewed objectively, their comments seem accurate. Fourth
Amendment law is certainly complex, but over the last two decades
vehicle that create the danger and the approach to that danger, and a police officer
should not have to calibrate what is in-critical and what is not critical. Fie should be
able to size up the situation, determine who's there, get full view of them when appro-
priate, get them out of the car to neutralize the situation, to get them away from the gun,
and we submit that the intrusion is de minimis.
Question: Well, why isn't Terry enough? I mean, your argument is that he ought to be
able to size up the situation. Terry gives him a chance to size up the situation.
General Reno: Terry might not have given, if the passenger had been in the same sitta-
tion as Mimms with a gun in his-under his sports coat, he might not have been able to
see that seated in the car.
Question: Well, then I think what you're really arguing, and I think this was what the A t-
torney General from Maryland was really arguing, is you really don't so much want him
to size up the situation. You simply want to have the fight to get him out of the car, pe-
riod. It's not going to be a question ofjudgment. It's going to be a question of routine
practice, I assume.
Oral Argument ofJanet Reno on Behalf of the United States as Amicus Curiae, Maryland v. Wi I-
son, 519 U.S. 408 (1997) (No. 95-1268), 1996WL 721111, at *21-22.
99 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 IARV. L. REV. 757, 758
(1994) (characterizing the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment doctrine as "not merely coin-
plex and contradictory, but often perverse"); Amsterdam, supra note 90; Craig M. Bradley, Two
Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1468 (1985) (discussing the large number of
critics wrangling over the inconsistency of Fourth Amendment cases and the misconception of
the doctrine); Wayne R. LaFave, Being Frank About the Fourth: On Allen's "Process of 'Factualization'
in the Search and Seizure Cases", 85 MICH. L. REV. 427, 439 (1986) (remarking that "the course of
true law pertaining to searches and seizures ... has not.., run smooth" (quoting Chapman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))); Luna, supra note 66, at
790-802 (arguing that Fourth Amendment law should be overhauled and proposing a theory
that "delineate[s] the primary purpose of the Fourth Amendment within the Constitution and a
concomitant method of enforcement").
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the trend of the Court's cases has been to expand police power."
This expansion of police power tends to provide a unifying theme, as
well as guidance to lower courtjudges and police officers in the field.
Of course, steady expansion of police search and seizure power is not
the source of the Fourth Amendment's complexity. Fourth Amend-
ment law is confusing and complex because the Court's reasonable-
ness analysis encourages ad hwc, subjective judgments about the need
for certain police intrusions and the nature and v-alue of Fourth
Amendment liberties.
Recall Maryland v. Wilson, which held that police have absolute
discretion to order passengers out of a car during a routine traffic
100 Even in cases where the defendant receives a favorable judgment. the Court's reasoning
in a particular case sometimes results in the expansion of police power. Sre, e.g.. Minnesota v.
Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993). Didcieon involved a seizure of contraband narcotics taken
from the defendant's pocket after a police frisk for weapons. The Minnesota Supreme Court
rejected the prosecution's claim that the Fourth Amendment permitted the seizure of illegal
narcotics under a "plain feel" theory. Although the Court affirmed the judgment of te Minn e-
sota Supreme Court, it explained that plain feel or plain touch seizures were proper under the
Fourth Amendment. The Court affirmed the state ruling because the officer's testimony re-
vealed that he did not immediately recognize the contraband in Dickerson's pocket. After Dich.
erson, officers rarely make the same mistake; officers now testify that while frisking a suspect the%
immediately recognized the feel of contraband drugs. Se, e.g., United States v. Maarolo. 204
F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2000) (accepting officer's testimony that 'little chunks" in defendant's
pocket had a "distinctive feel" and were immediately known to be contraband); United States v.
Walker, 181 F.3d 774 (6th Cir. 1999) (acknowledging officer's testimony that identity of contra-
band hidden in defendant's pants was immediately apparent prior to and during frisk); United
States v. Proctor, 148 F.Bd 39 (1st Cir. 1998) (accepting officer's testimony that bulge in defen-
dan's jacket pocket was immediately determined to be marijuana upon pat-down); United
States v. Craft, 30 F.3d 1044 (8th Cir. 1994) (denying plaintiff s motion to dismiss based on off i-
cer's testimony that bulges around the ankles were immediately identifiable as controlled sub-
stances); State v. Toth, 729 A-2d 1069 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (accepting trooper's testi-
mony that cocaine enclosed in paper bag was immediately identified during frisk despite
officer's inability to articulate the "tactile sensation" leading to his belief). Tailored testimonies
are becoming increasingly problematic. In some cases, even judges are finding officer-, testi-
monies too incredible to accept. See, eg., United States v. Mitchell, 832 F. Supp. 1073 (N.D.
Miss. 1993) (rejecting officer's testimony of his ability to immediately identify crack cocaine be-
neath layers of plastic, fabric, paper, and leather). Courts and scholars have acknowledged te
practice of conforming testimony to alidate searches. See, e.g., State v. Wonders, 952 P-2d 1351,
1364 (Kan. 1998) ("We are not unaware that experienced, knowledgeable law enforcement of-
ficers know the 'magic words' to be related when their searches and seizures are challenged.");
Kevin A. Lantz, Casenote, Search and Seizure- "The Princess and the 'Rechr" Minnzota Dzetlnes to
Extend "Plain View" to "Plain Fed," 18 U. DAYrON L REv. 539. 577 (1993) (finding plain feel
standard problematic due to the "fashioning of testimony to make otherwise invalid seizures
comply with a more traditional standard."). However, as one scholar notes. the hazards of the
plain touch doctrine extend beyond the practice of modifying testimony. Professor Der warns:
Due to the inexact nature of the sense of feel, police may strain to establish a plain touch
justification when one is not warranted by the facts. Officers may inappropriately reach
for plain touch by one of two iays: police may rush to a conclusion of probable cause
before the nebulous sense of touch merits it, or they may be tempted to prolong their
patdowns in order to increase their ability to form probable cause on the basis of touch.
George M. Dery, Ill, The Uncertain Reach of the Plain Touch Docinne: An Exarunaton of Minnesota
v. Dickerson and Its Impact on Currert Fourth Amendment Law and Daily Police Practice, 21 Am. J.
CRiM. L 385,402 (1994). Thus, although the defendant in Did'non won his case. the upshot of
Dickerson has been expanded search and seizure power for the police.
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stop. Wilson explained that officer safety justified this intrusion. The
Court reasoned that encounters involving several occupants of a ve-
hicle increased the potential threats to officer safety. On the other
side of the balance, Wilson recognized that a traffic stop, which gives
an officer reason to seize the driver, does not provide objective
grounds to detain or stop passengers since they are not responsible
for the traffic infraction. Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the
interests of passengers were not sufficiently different to justify ex-
empting them from the exit order that can be arbitrarily imposed
upon the driver. Logically, seizing the car also meant seizing passen-
gers, and the exit order simply means that passengers "will be outside
of, rather than inside of, the stopped car." 0' And once they are out
of the car, the Court reasoned:
the passengers will be denied access to any possible weapon that might be
concealed in the interior of the passenger compartment. It would seem
that the possibility of a violent encounter stems not from the ordinary re-
action of a motorist stopped for a speeding violation, but from the fact that
evidence of a more serious crime might be uncovered during the stop. And the
motivation of a passenger to employ violence to prevent apprehension of
such a crime is every bit as great as that of the driver.
In sum, the possibility that "a more serious crime might be uncov-
ered" during a traffic stop justified giving officers unchecked author-
ity to order passengers out of a car. A year later, however, a unani-
mous Court concluded that this same possibility did not justify
searching the passenger compartment during a traffic stop. In
Knowles v. Iowa, 3 a police officer stopped Patrick Knowles for speed-
ing. After issuing a citation, the officer searched Knowles and the
passenger compartment of his car, discovering narcotics inside the
car. Iowa law authorizes an arrest for a traffic violation, but it also al-
lows an officer to issue a traffic citation in lieu of arrest. If an officer
follows the latter procedure, Iowa law authorizes a search of the
driver and car equivalent in scope to a search incident-to-arrest.
Knowles held that a "search incident to citation" violated the
Fourth Amendment.'" Officer safety could not justify this intrusion
because the "threat to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation...
is a good deal less than in the case of a custodial arrest."'05 This re-
sponse answers the wrong question. The question in Knowles was not
1 Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414 (1997).
102 Id. (emphasis added).
103 525 U.S. 113 (1998).
104 The Court noted that Knowles did not contend that "the statute could never be lawfully
applied." Id. at 116. As noted by one student commentator, Knowles "neither approves of nor
rejects the [law authorizing the search]. It simply prohibits a certain interpretation of it."
CarolynJ. Zambelli, Note, A Band-Aid for the Fourth Amendment: Knowles v. Iowa and the Supreme
Court, 31 CONN. L. REv. 1217, 1243 (1999). Although Knowles left open the possibility that a
search under Iowa's statute might be upheld in a different context, it is difficult to imagine
what type of search the Court had in mind.
10, Knowles, 525 U.S. at 117.
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whether the threat to officer safety inherent in a traffic stop is com-
parable to the threat surrounding a custodial arrest. Rather, the
question in Knowles was whether the threat to officer safety inherent
in a traffic stop justifies overriding the privacy interest a driver enjoys
in the passenger compartment of his car. The safety interests at stake
in Knowles were the same interests the Court had relied upon a year
earlier in Wilson, namely, the possibility that "a more serious crime
might be uncovered" during the traffic stop and "the motivation of a
[motorist] to employ violence to prevent apprehension of such a
crime." '06 If these potential threats were sufficient to justify subject-
ing a motorist to an arbitrary seizure, why were these same threats not
sufficient to justify an arbitrary search of Knowles's car?
The Court's reply was predictable. It explained that a concern for
officer safety "may justify the 'minimal' additional intrusion of order-
ing" a motorist out of a car, but cannot justify "the often considerably
greater intrusion attending" a search of a car.'°  Moreover, Knowles
noted that officers have other means to protect themselves when ob-
jective evidence of a safety threat is present."' The Court's reasoning
illustrates how Fourth Amendment law often turns on subjective
evaluations rather than neutral principles.'" Why, in the context of a
routine traffic stop, does officer safety justify an arbitrary seizure, but
not an arbitrary search? It is true that Mimms and Wilson involved sei-
zures, while Knowles involved a search, but the Fourth Amendment
"speaks equally to both searches and seizures""" so the text of the
Amendment cannot explain the divergent outcomes.
The Court says a search is a "greater intrusion" than a seizure, but
this ipse dixit is not a neutral principle of law; it merely reflects the
Court's subjective evaluation of the interests at stake. Moreover, in
similar contexts, the Court has allowed arbitrary searches of cars,
notwithstanding the "greater intrusion" associated with searches. The
most notorious example was the search approved in New York v. Bel-
tonY" Belton held that when an occupant of a car has been arrested,
police may, as an incident to arrest and without cause, search the pas-
senger compartment of the car. 2  Belton authorizes arbitrary
searches, and is "based on the transparent fiction that a person ar-
rested, usually outside the car, will somehow be able to break away
and get back in the car to get a weapon or destroy evidence.""' The
106 lson, 519 U.S. at 414.
107 Knowes, 525 U.S. at 117.
108 Id. at 118.
109 See genera/ly Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Pncipl s of Coiftuluonal Law. 73 FHt'v. L
REv. 1 (1959).
110 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,428 (1976) (Powell.J., concurring).
1 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
112 Under Bdt, if a motorist is arrested for speeding, a search ofa briefcase or purse is valid.
even though there is no cause for the search.
1 Craig M. Bradley, Supreme Court Reieu: Proteaion for Moorzts-wu lh a Lopoi-!r. TRL. Feb.
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holding in Belton was wrong for the same reason that the holding in
Knowles was correct: there was no specific cause to search the car.
Instead of deciding on a case-by-case basis as the Court did in
Knowles whether an arbitrary search of a car is a "greater intrusion"
than some other hypothetical intrusion, why not ban all arbitrary
searches of cars? If the point of the Fourth Amendment is control-
ling discretionary police power, then arbitrary searches and seizures
are impermissible. If controlling discretionary intrusions is the cen-
tral purpose of the Amendment, then comparative judgments regard-
ing whether an arbitrary search of a car is a "greater intrusion" than
an arbitrary seizure of a motorist would be unnecessary. If there is no
cause for a search, and no evidence of a safety threat, then neither a
search nor a seizure should be permitted.'14  Instead of restraining
police discretion, the reasoning of Knowles encourages police to ar-
rest motorists selectively, which in turn will allow more arbitrary
searches." 5
Certainly, the divergent results in Wilson and Knowles can be ra-
tionally explained. A reasonable person might agree that an arbitrary
search is a "greater intrusion" than an arbitrary seizure. But for
someone who values officer safety as "both legitimate and weighty,""'
the results in these cases may be harder to explain. After all, the
Court had previously permitted arbitrary searches of automobiles in
1999, at 85, 86.
114 See id. ("[T]he criterion for whether a car can be searched should depend not on the na-
ture of the crime or on the fact of arrest but on whether the police have the requisite level of
suspicion that the driver has weapons or evidence in the car."); see also Visser, supra note 17, at
1694 (noting that when the Court's search-incident-to-arrest rule is applied to motorists, "police
officers have the equivalent of a general warrant to search a motorist and the interior of his or
her car subsequent to any lawful arrest for a traffic offense"); cf. David E. Steinberg, The Drive
Toward Warrantless Auto Searches: Suggestions from a Back Seat Driver, 80 B.U. L. REV. 545, 561
(2000) ("Courts should require a warrant prior to any auto search unless police face immediate
danger or an imminent loss of evidence.").
, See Transcript of Oral Argument at 41-42, Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998) (No. 97-
7597) (counsel for the State conceding that police could arrest a motorist for a traffic violation
in order to effectuate a search); Bradley, supra note 113, at 86 ("Until the Court closes the
loophole left open in Knowles, the effect of the decision will encourage more arrests and greater
intrusions on personal privacy than is currently allowed .... The way to stop such shenanigans
is to require probable cause to search automobiles and abandon the special category of
searches incident to arrest."). Because the result in Knowles is easily avoided by arresting the
driver, and because a search incident to arrest need not precede the actual arrest, see Rawlings
v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980) ("Where the formal arrest followed quickly on the heels of
the challenged search of petitioner's person, we do not believe it particularly important that the
search preceded the arrest rather than vice versa."), some have called for the Court to limit the
authority of the police to arrest drivers for minor traffic offenses. See Oliver, supra note 17, at
1453 ("The unanimous decision in Knowles simply would make no sense if probable cause to
believe an offender had committed a traffic offense alone justified taking him into custody.").
In Atwaterv. City of Lago Vista, No. 99-1408 (cert. granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3566 (U.S.June 26, 2000)),
the Court will address whether the Fourth Amendment imposes any limitations on the authority
of the police to make custodial arrests for a fine-only traffic offense.
116 Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. at 117 (quoting Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 412 (1997)
(quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977) (per curiam))).
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contexts where there was no objective threat to officer safety, andjus-
tified the results primarily on officer-safety grounds." Also, the
Court has repeatedly denigrated the notion that motorists have a
heightened expectation of privacy regarding property located inside
automobiles. 8 More importantly, a rational person who places a
premium on police safety might reasonably find that the potential
dangers that officers face when conducting traffic stops not only jus-
tify the arbitrary seizures approved in Mimis and Wilson, but also the
arbitrary search at issue in Knowles."9
The divergent views of police safety in Wilson and Knowles illustrate
the subjective nature of the Court's reasoning. In Wilson, a potential
threat to officer safety justifies an arbitrary seizure; but in Knowles,
that same threat does not justify an arbitrary search. Yet, in Belton, a
search greater in scope than the search involved in Knou'les is permit-
ted because of the potential threat to officer safety. These cases also
demonstrate the haphazard way the Court measures the nature and
value of Fourth Amendment interests. The text of the Amendment
applies to both searches and seizures equally. Thus, the interest in be-
ing free from arbitrary seizures is just as important as the interest in
being free from arbitrary searches.'^ Yet, in Wilson, an arbitrary sei-
17 See, eg., NewYork v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986) (upholding a suspicionless search for the
vehicle identification number during a routine traffic stop); Bdton, 453 U.S. at 454.
11 See, e-g., Houghton, 526 U.S. at 303 ("Passengers, no less than drivers, Possess a reduced
expectation of privacy with regard to the property that they transport in car, which 'tran.el]
public thoroughfares,' 'seldom serv[e] as... the repository of personal effects.' are subjected to
police stop and examination to enforce "pervasive" governmental controls '[als an eer)das oc-
currence,' and, finally, are exposed to traffic accidents that may render all their contents open
to public scrutiny." (citations omitted)); see also Maryland v. Dyson. 527 U.S. 463. 467 (1999)
(per curium) (reiterating that under the "automobile exception" it is unnecesmn to make a
separate finding of exigency in addition to a finding of probable cause to justify a ,arrantess
automobile search).
119 See Francis X. Clines, Police-Killers Offer Insights into 17an'Fatal .fstaPr^, N.Y. Tibetts. Mar.
9, 1993, at Al (describing incidents where motorists killed officers who had not paid close at-
tention to the actions and movements of their killers). In a different context, a few lo-%er courts
have upheld suspicionless frisks of motorists and their passengers. See, e.g.. State %. B1arrow No.
1998CA00299, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 2788 (Ohio Ct. App.June 7. 1999) (passenger niuy be
frisked before being detained in a police cruiser); Moore v. Commn .ealth. 487 S.E.2d 864
(Va. CL App. 1997) (noting that suspicionless frisk may be permissible in context of police-
citizen encounter requiring investigation of suspected criminal activity or protection of the pub-
lic safety); State v. Lombardi, 727 A.2d 670 (R.I. 1999) (holding that officer's frisk of intoxi-
cated passenger prior to driving him home %as a minimal intrusion and not prohibited by the
Fourth Amendment). But cf. State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1993) (rejecting blanket
rule that would allow officers to routinely frisk motorists placed in police cruiser); State v. Lo-
zada, Case No. 98-P-0098, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 6135 (Ohio App. Ct. Dec. 17, 1999, apeal
docketed, No. 99-2316 (May 17, 2000) (rejecting routine practice of frisking motorists in traffic
stops prior to entering patrol car in absence of reasonable and objective grounds that the sub-
ject is potentially dangerous).
1- AsJustice Scalia noted in Arizona v. Hicis 480 U.S. 321, 328 (1987). because the Amend-
ment protects against both searches and seizures, "neither the one nor the other is of inferior
worth or necessarily requires only lesser protection. We have not elsewhiere drawn a categoncal
distinction between the two insofar as concerns the degree of justification needed to establish
the reasonableness of police action.. . "
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zure of a passenger is dismissed as "minimal" and not permitted to
trump a potential threat to officer safety. Conversely, Knowles pays lip
service to the "concern for officer safety" but concludes that an arbi-
trary search cannot be permitted even though the intrusion might
advance police safety. If controlling police discretion were the guid-
ing principle of Fourth Amendment law, neither intrusion would be
permitted, and the reasoning of the Court's cases would make more
sense.
II. APPLYING THE NORM OF CONTROLLING POLICE DISCRETION
A. What is a "Search" Under the Reasonableness Model?
A reasonableness model is used not only to decide whether a par-
ticular police intrusion violates the Fourth Amendment, but also to
decide the threshold question of whether police activity triggers
Fourth Amendment scrutiny ab initio. Police activity that is not
deemed a "search" under the Amendment need not be exercised in a
"reasonable" manner;12 intrusions falling into the "non-search" cate-
gory "may be as unreasonable as the police please to make them."'
In determining whether a police intrusion is a search, the Court
decides whether the person challenging the police activity had a "rea-
sonable expectation of privacy" in the targeted area. This formula
comes from Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in the landmark
case of Katz v. United States.'23 The Katz test consists of a two-part in-
quiry: first, did the person have a subjective expectation of privacy in
the area targeted by the police? Second, was this an expectation that
society considers reasonable? The Katz test has been applied in a va-
riety of circumstances. The upshot of the Court's cases has recently
been described as follows:
[T]he police can see and hear only those things that the rest of us can
see and hear [without triggering Fourth Amendment protection]....
The pattern is clear enough: the police can infringe privacy in ways that
anyone else might infringe it, but not ... in ways that differ from the
sorts of things ordinary people might do. All these results seem designed
to take the privacy people have, and use it to define the privacy that theS 124
police cannot invade without some good cause.
This description of how the Court defines the Fourth Amend-
ment's boundaries rightly acknowledges that "police can infringe pri-
vacy in ways that anyone else might infringe it" but it omits a criti-
121 See Amsterdam, supra note 90, at 356 ("The words 'searches and seizures' . . . are terms of
limitation. Law enforcement practices are not required by the fourth amendment to be rea-
sonable unless they are either 'searches' or 'seizures.'" (footnote omitted)).
122 Id. at 388.
123 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan,J., concurring).
124 Stuntz, Distribution, supra note 17, at 1269.
1Z Id.
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cal aspect of the Court's analysis. Like other parts of its Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, the Court's "expectation of priv-acy"
analysis rests on the ad Iwc conclusions of theJustices and ignores the
reality of police practices. To put it mildly, "the Supreme Court's
conclusions about the scope of the Fourth Amendment are often not
in tune with commonly held attitudes about police investigative tech-
niques."2 6 More importantly, controlling police discretion is not part
of the Court's analysis. To the extent that society is concerned about
"the amount of power that it permits its police to use without effec-
tive control by law, "'2 omitting this factor is illogical. Restraining po-
lice discretion should be the crucial consideration when deciding
whether intrusive activities are subject to constitutional scrutiny. If
police are permitted to intrude at their leisure, we no longer live in a
free society. Thus, the boundaries of the Amendment define the
breadth of our freedom.12 8
For example, many Americans would be surprised to learn that
the Fourth Amendment, as interpreted by the Court, imposes no re-
straints on the government's power to infiltrate our homes, busi-
nesses, religious organizations, or social groups with undercover
spies.'9 There are many other intrusive activities that the Court
leaves solely to the discretion of the police on the grounds that the
individual has no "reasonable expectation of privacy" in the place or
premises targeted by the police. In some cases, the Court's conclu-
sion that no "search" has occurred not only defies common sense, but
also gives police officials unchecked power to invade our personal se-
curity. Consider two examples: inspection of one's garbage and aer-
ial photography of one's property. XWhien a police officer sifts
through a person's garbage looking for evidence of illegal drug pos-
session, or flies a helicopter over a home to photograph marijuana
plants growing in the backyard, what else is the officer doing, if not
"searching" for criminal activities?' " Moreover, to the average per-
son, the intrusions that the Court has left to the unfettered discretion
". Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 7, at 774.
1 Amsterdam, supra note 90, at 377.
128 As Professor Yale Kamisar notes, the Fourth Amendment sercvs a.s -ai centerpiece of a
free, democratic society." Yale Kamisar, The Fourth Amrndrinnt and Its Elxdusonary Rule. TIlE
CHAMPION, Aug. 1991, at 2.
1 See Macin, Informants, supra note 69, at 573-77.
1W' "To most lay people, looking for evidence of crime is a 'search,' regardless of %%hat tial
term may mean under the Fourth Amendment." Slobogin, supra note 69. at 22 it. 65. In Cad-
fornia v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988), the Court conduded that police could srue and exam-
ine opaque, sealed garbage bags left for collection at the curb of a home uithout triggering
Fourth Amendment protections. In Florida v. Ril,., 488 U.S. 445 (19S9). the Court ruled that
helicopter surveillance four hundred feet above a greenhouse located near a private home %as
not a search. The result in Rilo %%as supported by the earlier ruling in California m. Crao!o. 476
U.S. 207 (1986), which held that police observation of a backyard from an airplanie Ming in
navigable airspace did not constitute a search. For a critique of these rulings. see Traco
Maclin,Justice Thurgood MaarshalL Taldng the Fourth Amendment Smoust , 77 CoRNiL L Rix. 723.
744 (1992) (asserting that "the Court's arguments in Riln and Grwnnood deft common sense)'.
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
of the police are highly invasive, and they certainly feel and look like
"searches.",3 1 Indeed, as Professor Amsterdam has noted, " [t]he plain
meaning of the English language would surely not be affronted if
every police activity that involves seeking out crime or evidence of
crime were held to be a search."032 If clear thinking and a norm of
controlling police discretion were utilized to decide whether police
activity designed to disclose criminal behavior constituted a search
under the Amendment, then many more police investigative prac-
tices would trigger Fourth Amendment review.
s3
Of course, if controlling discretionary police power were the prin-
cipal consideration when defining the scope of the Fourth Amend-
ment, the police would be greatly inhibited in the types of investiga-
tive activities they could undertake without prior justification or
judicial approval. But controlling the discretion of law enforcement
officers has other benefits in addition to eliminating arbitrary intru-
sions into our personal security and privacy. If the FBI were required
to secure a judicial warrant before infiltrating our homes or busi-
nesses with undercover informants, there might be fewer undercover
searches. Those searches that are approved, however, will likely be
"better quality searches"'' because FBI agents will be permitted to
search only when they have good 
reason. 3  -
But the Court has been unwilling to interpret the Fourth
Amendment's scope in a manner designed to restrict discretionary
151 Cf. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 7, at 760 ("Judges, especially the Justices on the
Supreme Court, are unlikely to have experienced any type of police intrusion, much less the
type of intrusion they are asked to analyze in a particular case. Thus, they are likely to evaluate
intrusiveness from a Third Person perspective. Yet intrusiveness is probably more appropriately
viewed from the First Person perspective; privacy and autonomy are constructs that are, almost
by definition, intimate, subjective, and experiential. In short, courts may suffer from a 'distanc-
inq effect' in evaluating intrusiveness." (footnote omitted)).
Amsterdam, supra note 90, at 396.
1 Cf. id. ("When the policeman shines his flashlight in the parked car or listens at the tene-
ment door, what else is he doing than searching? When he climbs up a telephone pole and
peers beneath a second-story window shade, what on earth is he doing up that pole but search-
ing? What is a police spy used for, but to search out suspected wrongdoing that would other-
wise evade the scrutiny of the authorities? Unless history restricts the amplitude of language, no
police investigative activity can escape the fourth amendment's grasp."); California v. Acevedo,
500 U.S. 565, 583 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Our intricate body of law
regarding 'reasonable expectation of privacy' has been developed largely as a means of creating
[exceptions to the warrant requirement], enabling a search to be denominated not a Fourth
Amendment 'search' and therefore not subject to the general warrant requirement.").
13 Stuntz, Distribution, supra note 17, at 1275 (noting that the requirement of judicial
authorization before police may search a home "make[s] for better house searches").
155 See id. ("A police officer with no more than a hunch that cocaine can be found in my
basement will not likely look for it there. His hunch alone will not support a warrant, and with-
out a warrant any cocaine he finds will be suppressed. This state of affairs should lead the offi-
cer to gather more evidence, which will either permit him to get a warrant or lead him to dis-
card his hunch. The result is that officers will tend to search houses like mine when, but only
when, they have good reason to believe they will find cocaine, or something similarly serious.
This is the usual Fourth Amendment story; its essence is the law's tendency to produce better
quality searches.").
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police intrusions. Instead, the Court has turned to the "reasonable
expectation of privacy" model of the Katz test. As currently applied,
the Katz test not only fails to control discretionary intrusions, it also
lacks content and substance. Under the best circumstances, the Katz
test is prone to circular reasoning.'5" At its worst, Katz's "reasonable
expectation of privacy" framework is a malleable formula. The
Court's precedents are not built upon objective legal principles;
rather, the Court's rulings simply reflect the current sentiments of a
majority of the Justices deciding whether a particular police investiga-
tive practice is reasonable under the circumstances. Lately, a few
members of the Court themselves have acknowledged the emptiness
of the Katz test. Last Term, Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion
that Justice Thomas joined, described the Katz formula as a "notori-
ously unhelpful" and "self-indulgent" test.' s In Justice Scalia's view,
the Katz test means what a majority of the Court says it means, no
more and no less.'s3 The Court's two most recent cases in this area,
Minnesota v. Carter and Bond v. United States,ss reveal the accuracy of
Justice Scalia's comments and indicate why controlling police discre-
tion is a superior legal norm for measuring the scope of the Fourth
Amendment.
Minnesota v. Carter involved the following facts: an anonymous in-
formant told an Eagan, Minnesota, police officer that he saw people
"bagging" white powder inside a ground-floor apartment. With only
this tip, the officer went to the apartment and stood outside a win-
dow. Although the blinds were closed, the officer could see through
a gap in the blinds. Inside he observed three persons, two males and
a female, placing white powder into plastic bags. Other officers were
notified. The two men, Carter and Johns, were subsequently arrested
outside of the apartment, and the police eventually obtained a war-
rant to search the apartment. The female, Thompson, was the lease-
holder of the apartment. It was later learned that Carter and Johns,
who lived in Chicago, came to the apartment to package cocaine. Af-
ter they were convicted on narcotics charges, the Minnesota Supreme
Court overturned the convictions. That court ruled that the defen-
dants had a legitimate expectation of privacy while inside the home
of their host. Thus, their Fourth Amendment rights were iolated
S See, eg., Amsterdam, supra note 90, at 385 ('In the end, the basis of the Kat: decision
seems to be that the fourth amendment protects those interests that mayjustifiablY claim fourth
amendment protection. Of course this begs the question. But 1 think it begs the question no
more or less than any other theory of fourth amendment coverage that the Court has used.').
7 innesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (ScaliaJ., concurring).
138 According to Justice Scalia, "the only thing the past three decades have established about
the K!atz test (which has come to mean the test enunciated by justice Harlan's separate concur-
rence in Katz) is that, unsurprisingly, those 'actual (subjective) expectationtsl of priacy' 'that
society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable," bear an uncanny resemblance to those expec-
tations of privacy that this Court considers reasonable." 525 U.S. at 97 (Scalia.J.. concurring)
(internal citations omitted).
's 120 S. Ct. 1462 (2000).
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when the officer observed their conduct inside the apartment
through a warrantless search. The Supreme Court granted review in
Carter to decide two issues. First, does an invitee into a home enjoy a
legitimate privacy interest under the Fourth Amendment when his
connection to the premises is to assist the homeowner in criminal
conduct? Two, is unaided observation of a home that occurs from a
public place outside of the curtilage a search under the Fourth
Amendment? The Court left the second issue undecided because it
concluded that the defendants could not claim a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in their host's home.
Writing for a splintered five-Justice majority, Chief Justice
Rehnquist first made passing references to the Katz analysis and the
text of the Fourth Amendment, which, when juxtaposed, appeared to
send contradictory signals about the defendants' constitutional claim.
On the one hand, under Katz's expectation of privacy framework,
"the extent to which the Fourth Amendment protects people may
depend upon where those people are."4° Since Carter and Johns were
invited guests in a private home-a place that receives the most scru-
pulous protection under the Court's precedents-one might have
thought that the Court would rule in their favor because "the sanctity
of the home.., has been embedded in our traditions since the ori-
gins of the Republic." 41 On the other hand, Chief Justice Rehnquist
noted that the text of the Fourth Amendment weakened the defen-
dants' claim because it "suggests that its protections extend only to
people in 'their' houses. The Chief Justice explained, however,
that this textual limitation was not automatically fatal to the defen-
dants' claim because the Court's precedents have "held that in some
circumstances a person may have a legitimate expectation of privacy
in the house of someone else.'1
4
Instead of relying on the text of the Amendment, the ChiefJustice
returned to Katz's reasonable expectation of privacy analysis. Two
cases were particularly relevant. First, although it involved the search
of a car rather than a home, Rakas v. Illinois' rejected the previously
accepted rule that merely being legitimately on the premises entitled
a person to Fourth Amendment protection.145 After Rakas, a person
was required to show more than lawful presence to obtain judicial
scrutiny of a police search-he must show "a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the invaded place."'' 6 The second case on point was
Minnesota v. Olson,'47 which held that an overnight guest had a legiti-
140 Carter, 525 U.S. at 88 (emphasis added).
141 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980).
142 Carter, 525 U.S. at 89.
143 Id.
144 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
145 Id. at 141-45.
146 Id. at 143.
147 495 U.S. 91 (1990).
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mate expectation of privacy in his host's home. The Chief Justice
read these precedents to stand for the proposition that "an overnight
guest in a home may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment,
but one who is merely present with the consent of the householder
may not."1 8 According to the Chief Justice, the facts in Carter were
"somewhere in between" the rules announced in Olson and Rahas.
Ultimately, the Court concluded that the defendants did not have a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the home. This conclusion rested
on "the purely commercial nature" of their conduct, their "relatively
short period of time.., on the premises," and the "lack of an) previ-
ous connection" between the defendants and the host.""
Carter indicates the malleability and emptiness of the "reasonable
expectation of privacy" analysis. Recognizing that the defendants
were observed in a location that normally receives the highest degree
of protection under the Fourth Amendment,'5 the Carter majority ig-
nored that heretofore critical fact and instead focused on the pirpose
of the defendants' activities."' This reasoning suggests that if instead
of packaging cocaine, the defendants and their host had been dis-
cussing their educational backgrounds or making plans for an up-
coming vacation, the result in Carter would have different. This rea-
soning also suggests that if the defendants had been in the apartment
for an overnight stay or had visited the apartment on several prior
occasions, then their claim to constitutional protection would have
been stronger. But why should these alterations matter? If Fourth
Amendment rights are "personal," as the Court repeatedly empha-
sizes, and if the defendants were observed in a place accorded the
maximum degree of protection under the Amendment, why should it
matter whether the defendants were "essentially present for a busi-
ness transaction" rather than a social visit.trI. In either case, the de-
fendants were relying, as does anyone who uses a telephone at a
friend's house, upon the security and privacy of the host's home to
shield their activities from police surveillance. That security was
breached when the officer, without a w%,arrant, probable cause, con-
148 Carter, 525 U.S. at 90.
1 Id. at 84.
15 See, eg., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984) ("At the risk of belaboring the
obvious, private residences are places in which the indihidual normally expects privacy free of
governmental intrusion not authorized by a warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that
society is prepared to recognize as justifiable.")
"' See Carter, 525 U.S. at 90 ("While the apartment was a dwelling place for Thompson. it was
for these respondents simply a place to do business.").
12See, eg., Rakas, 439 U.S. at 133-34 ("Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which,
like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted." (citations omitted)).
5 See Lloyd L Weinreb, Your Place or Mine? Privaq' of Presene Under the Fourth Aw.endrwnt
1999 SuP. CT. REv. 253, 273 (noting that there is "nothing in the amendment itself to support
such a distinction" and that "conventional understandings do not support the iew that business
activities in general are less private than social activities; the range and variety of both are too
great for any such generalization").
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sent, or exigent circumstances, observed their activities. The com-
mercial nature of their conduct should not undermine their right to
Fourth Amendment protection unless the Court is prepared to say in
a future case that a homeowner also lacks an expectation of privacy in
her home once she decides to use her residence for commercial pur-
poses. s4 A home does not become any less of a home for Fourth
Amendment purposes because the persons inside decide to violate
the law. The commercial nature or purpose of the defendants' activi-
ties sheds no light on the question that should capture the Court's
attention: should police have unfettered discretion to monitor the
activities of persons who have been invited into a private home?
Nor should it matter that the Carter defendants' brief stay in the
home was insufficiently similar "to the overnight guest relationship in
Olson to suggest a degree of acceptance into the household."'' Con-
stitutional rights should be assessed in qualitative, not quantitative,
terms. 1 6 When deciding whether a visitor or guest is entitled to be
secure against unreasonable intrusions while in the home of their
host, the result should not turn on the length of the visit or whether
one stays until the next day's dawn. Otherwise, a homeowner's sexual
154 The weight that the Court's analysis in Carter placed on the purpose of the defendants'
presence in the home is reminiscent ofJustice Brennan's concurrence in Lewis v. United States,
385 U.S. 206 (1966). In Lewis, an undercover officer misrepresented his identity and obtained
permission to enter Lewis's home to purchase illegal narcotics. The Lewis Court ruled that
while a private home is normally "accorded the full range of Fourth Amendment protections,"
those protections did not extend to Lewis. Id. at 211.
[Where a home] is converted into a commercial center to which outsiders are invited for
purposes of transacting unlawful business, that business is entitled to no greater sanctity
than if it were carried on in a store, a garage, a car, or on the street. A government
agent, in the same manner as a private person, may accept an invitation to do business
and may enter upon the premises for the very purposes contemplated by the occupant.
I& In other words, by conducting a commercial transaction in his home, Lewis had "waived"
the Fourth Amendment protection normally given to his home. In his concurrence Justice
Brennan made explicit what the Lewis Court implied: ["Lewis's] apartment was not an area
protected by the Fourth Amendment as related to the transactions in the present case." Id. at
213 (Brennan, J., concurring). According to Justice Brennan, a homeowner can "waive his
right to privacy" and does so "to the extent that he opens his home to the transaction of busi-
ness and invites anyone willing to enter to come in to trade with him." Id. For a critique of
Lewis and the Court's other informant cases, see Maclin, Informants, supra note 69, at 615.
By emphasizing the purpose of the defendants' presence in Carter, perhaps the Carter Court
intended to invoke the "waiver theory" espoused by Justice Brennan. More likely, by emphasiz-
ing the commercial purpose of the defendants' activity, the Carter Court meant to subtly draw
attention to the illegal nature of the defendants' conduct inside the home. The problem with
this approach, however, is that the Court's precedents have already rejected the notion that the
criminal nature of a defendant's conduct is a relevant criterion in deciding whether he pos-
sesses a reasonable expectation of privacy in a home. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American
Civil Liberties Union et al. at 14-15, Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998) (No. 97-1147) ("If
[the prosecution's] theory is correct that the criminal nature of a defendant's activity is relevant
when measuring one's Fourth Amendment standing, then guilty people would never have
standing." (footnote omitted)).
I Carter, 525 U.S. at 90.
1 Cf Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987) ("A search is a search, even if it happens to
disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable.").
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partner would have no expectation of privacy in the home and no
standing to object if the police peered through the dosed blinds of a
bedroom window, unless that sexual partner spent the night. '"
While Carter ruled that houseguests may not always rely on the se-
curity and privacy of their host's home, Bond v. United States con-
fronted the Court with a different aspect of privacy. Steven Dew-ayne
Bond was a passenger on a bus that left California heading for Arkan-
sas. At a border patrol checkpoint in Texas, an immigration officer
squeezed Bond's canvas bag that was in the overhead compartment.
The officer felt a "brick-like" object inside. After opening the bag,
the officer found a "brick" of methamphetamine. The issue in Bond
was whether the officer's physical manipulation of the luggage consti-
tuted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The
Court concluded that it was.
In Bond, unlike the fractured opinion in Carter, Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote for a majority of seven Justices. The Chief Justice
first rejected the government's argument that by exposing his lug-
gage to other passengers, Bond lost a reasonable expectation that his
luggage would not be subject to physical manipulation. While ac-
knowledging that the Court has refused to extend Fourth Amend-
ment protection to activities and places exposed to the public, the
ChiefJustice explained that the officer's manipulation of Bond's lug-
gage was unlike the aerial surveillance that the Court found permissi-
ble in California v. Ciraolo and Florida v. Rileq. "Physically invasive in-
spection is simply more intrusive than purely visual inspection.""'
After noting that physical inspections are more intrusive than vis-
ual inspections, the ChiefJustice then moved to the crux of the mat-
ter. Bond conceded that by placing his bag in the overhead bin, he
understood that it would be exposed to certain types of handling.
157 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union et al. at 19. Minnesota v.
Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998) (No. 97-1147); WVeinreb. supra note 153, at 262 ('If a man and a
woman meet at a party and leave together, when one of them says, 'Your place or mine?" the
answer will determine which of them can count on what happens thereafter remaining beyond
the scrutiny of the police-unless, at least, they make a night of it. Those consequences rest on
the Court's assertion that none of those persons has a legitimate expectation of privacy in what
is said or done in those circumstances."). Interestingly, Coadrdoes not consider the two-prong
inquiry of the Katz test. As noted above, supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text. that test
entitles a person to Fourth Amendment protection if he, first. shows a subjective expectation of
privacy and, second, convinces the Court that his expectation of privacy is one that society is
prepared to consider as reasonable. Applying that test to the facts in Carter and to the above
sexual partner hypothetical, the defendants' legal positions in both instances appear strong.
First, in both cases the defendants sought to preserve their privacy by locating themselves in a
private home. Second, society would surely regard the defendants' subjective expectations re-
garding the privacy they shared with their hosts as reasonable. This is because i[wle %ill all be
hosts and we -%ill all be guests many times in our lives. From either perspective, we think that
society recognizes that a houseguest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his host's home.-
Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990). This is even more obvious ith respect to the sex-
ual partner hypothetical, given that society traditionally regards sexual behavior as highly pri-
vate.
153 Bond, 120 S. CL at 1464.
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However, Bond contended that the officer's handling went beyond
the type of casual touching that he expected from other passengers.
The government responded that the officer's touch was similar to the
type of contact a passenger might have with the bag. Applying the
two-part test of Katz, the Chief Justice seemed to conclude that Bond
had established the first requirement of a subjective expectation of
privacy. The Court opined that Bond "sought to preserve privacy by
using an opaque bag and placing that bag directly above his seat.
The more difficult question involved the second prong of Katz:
whether this expectation was one society would find reasonable.
On that question, the Chief Justice reaffirmed that an officer's
subjective intent or purpose behind the intrusion was irrelevant to
whether his actions constituted a search. "[T]he issue is not his state
of mind, but the objective effect of his actions." 'O° Ultimately, the
Chief Justice concluded that a search occurred on the grounds that a
bus passenger, while he expects that his luggage may be handled,
"does not expect that other passengers or bus employees will, as a
matter of course, feel the bag in an exploratory manner."' In other
words, an officer's motive for touching a bag-to ascertain whether
contraband might be inside-is unimportant. However, the "man-
ner" or intensity of his touch is relevant.
The result in Bond is perplexing. The core of the Chief Justice's
reasoning rests on a razor-thin distinction that has no nexus to the
realities of police work. Bond implies that touching luggage in a
manner that is the equivalent of what a passenger might do to create
more room in the overhead rack is not a search. But a squeeze to
explore the contents of the luggage is a search. The practical prob-
lem with this distinction is that officers looking for drugs or guns
have no reason to perform the former type of touch. The officer who
squeezed Bond's canvas bag was not helping another passenger cre-
ate more space in the overhead rack. He was feeling (or "squeezing")
for contraband. Law enforcement officers do not manipulate lug-
gage to create more room in overhead compartments. Their squeez-
ing will always be done in an exploratory manner; otherwise, they are
wasting their time and taxpayers' money. If read literally, the upshot
of Bond will either be the elimination of police "squeezes" (which is
unlikely) or a new "constitutional jurisprudence of [Fourth Amend-
ment] 'squeezes ' ' 6' that endeavors to distinguish permissible from
impermissible touches.
Another puzzling point in Bond is the emphasis placed on the dis-
tinction between visual and tactile inspections. As an abstract matter,
the Court is probably correct when it notes that "[p]hysically invasive
159 Id. at 1465.
160 Id. at 1465 n.2 (emphasis added).
161 Id. at 1465 (emphasis added).
1r2 Id. at 1467 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
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inspection is simply more intrusive than purely visual inspection."' '
But why should this difference matter when deciding whether the
Fourth Amendment covers the officer's squeeze of Bond's bag? The
Court acknowledged Bond's concession that "a bus passenger clearly
expects that his bag may be handled."" According to the Court,
Bond did not argue that he had a reasonable expectation that his bag
would not be felt while on the bus. Thus, the dispute wras not about
whether the officer could touch the bag- absent an objection from
Bond, merely touching the bag did not violate any of Bond's rights.'"
If the officer had touched Bond's bag in a manner consistent with the
touch that a passenger might employ, the officer's actions would not
have triggered constitutional review. Instead, the issue confronting
the Court concerned the intensity of his touch. Viewed this way, the
distinction between physical and tactile inspections is immaterial to
the question of whether the Fourth Amendment covered the officer's
squeeze of Bond's bag.
There is an additional reason why the distinction between visual
and tactile inspection seems unimportant. If, while checking Bond's
immigration status, the officer had coincidentally rested his hand on
Bond's bag and immediately recognized the contour of a gun or a
"brick" of methamphetamine, the officer would have been free to
seize the gun or contraband. This is so because in Minnesota v. Dither-
sonl the Court extended the "plain-view" doctrine to the sense of
touch. "The rationale of the plain-view doctrine is that if contraband
is left in open view and is observed by a police officer from a lawful
vantage point, there has been no invasion of a legitimate expectation
of privacy and thus no 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment-or at least no search independent of the initial intru-
sion that gave the officers their vantage point"'" Dicherson explained
that the plain-view rule "has an obvious application by analogy to
cases in which an officer discovers contraband through the sense of
touch during an otherwise lawful search."'" Thus, Didlerson permits a
search and seizure when an officer's sense of touch immediately con-
firms the presence of contraband. In my hypothetical, the officer's
touch of the bag would not have invaded any constitutional interest
of Bond. This is because the agent was lawfully positioned to touch
the bag as might any other passenger, and his touch revealed "an ob-
ject whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately appar-
163 Id- at 1464.
A Id. at 1465.
16 The issue would be different if instead of putting the bag in te oerhead bin, Bond kept
his bag in his lap. In the latter case, Bond could plausibly assert that he had a reasonable ex-
pectation that his bag would not be felt.
166 508 U.S. 366 (1993).
17 Id. at 375.
16 Id
JOURNAL OF CONSTFUTIONAL LA W
ent.... ,,69 Although Dickerson recognized that "touch is more intru-
sive into privacy than is sight,"7 that judgment is irrelevant to the
privacy expectations of my hypothetical bus passenger.' If the
greater intrusiveness inherent in touch has no bearing on whether a
search occurred in my hypothetical case, why does it matter in Bond?
The ChiefJustice's opinion provides no answer to this question.' 2
In sum, Bonds distinction between "visual, as opposed to tactile,
observation,"'" and its judgment that " [p]hysically invasive inspection
is simply more intrusive than purely visual inspection" 74 are beside
the point. Dickerson had already established that officers may rely on
their sense of touch to make searches and seizures. Further, the Bond
Court did not hold that Bond had a reasonable expectation of privacy
that his bag would not be touched at all. On the contrary, the Court
stated "a bus passenger clearly expects that his bag may be han-
dled.' ' 75 Thus, the issue in Bond was not whether the bag could be
touched-it clearly could be; instead, the fight was about the intensity
of the touch. When these factors are added to the mix, one has to
wonder whether the ultimate impact of Bond will be that officers will
be more careful during suppression hearings in describing how they"squeezed" a passenger's bag.
The final puzzling point in Bond is the role "purpose" played in
the outcome. The ChiefJustice confirms that the subjective intent of
the agent is irrelevant for determining whether a search occurred:
"the issue is not his state of mind, but the objective effect of his ac-
,,176tions. As a matter of doctrine, the Court has virtually eliminated
an officer's subjective intent as a factor in Fourth Amendment analy-
sis generally.7 7 -More particularly, when determining the scope of the
Amendment, the intent or purpose of the officer is a non-issue.Y
Despite this consensus among the Justices, the facts in Bond appeared
to raise doubt, at least in some quarters, about the Court's unwilling-
ness to consider purpose when calculating privacy interests. During
oral argument, Justice Souter noted that an officer's purpose may be
169 Id.
170 Id. at 377.
171 Id. ("The seizure of an item whose identity is already known occasions no further invasion
of gprivacy.").
The ChiefJustice's opinion does not even cite Dickerson.
'7' Bond, 120 S. Ct. at 1464.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 1465.
176 Id. at 1465 n.2.
177 See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) ("Subjective intentions play no
role in ordinary, probable cause Fourth Amendment analysis."); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33,
38 (1996) (same); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990) ("[Elvenhanded law en-
forcement is best achieved by the application of objective standards of conduct, rather than
standards that depend upon the subjective state of mind of the officer.").
178 See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 n.2 (1986) (stating that an officer's pur-
pose in focusing on defendant's marijuana crop from aircraft was irrelevant since the plants
were exposed to the public).
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highly relevant when measuring a person's legitimate expectation of
privacy:
I mean, our purpose inquiry, again, turns at different levels. We say the
very fact that you may have a law enforcement objective, purpose in mind
as opposed to a private one doesn't matter, but it seems to me that at a
lower level of generality the purpose for which you may engage in touch-
ing may very well matter. Take a nonlaw enforcement example. We both
agree that generally speaking we expose ourselves to being looked at, but
we don't expose things that we carry to being touched, so if somebody
comes up to you on the street and starts feeling tie package you have in
mind, you'd tell them to get away. On the other band, if you drop the
package and someone politely comes along and picks it up for you, even
though they're touching it, you'd say thank you. In that sense, at that
level of purpose, purpose matters a very great deal to reasonable expecta-
tion, and that's the suggestion that I'm making about the purpose for
which luggage is touched. It is touched for the purpose of being moved,
not for the purpose of being explored, and I don't see why that is not a
relevant consideration for the law in judging reasonable expectation."
Justice Souter's comments are not only thoughtful, but they also
help illustrate why purpose may be relevant when measuring Fourth
Amendment interests. Justice Souter's remarks reveal that ordinary
(as opposed to constitutional) privacy interests are variable, and their
existence may depend on context, as well as on the actions of third
parties. The reasonable person who drops a package will not be of-
fended when the bystander picks it up for her, even though the by-
stander will have to touch it. But if the bystander attempts to touch
the package held by a person, then the expectations and reactions of
the reasonable person will be different. Purpose matters here. But
purpose should also matter in Bond, as well as in Carler, when deter-
mining constitutional privacy interests. And this is where Justice
Souter's comments expose the flaw in the Court's refusal to consider
purpose when it decides the scope of the Fourth Amendment.
The bus passenger who watches another passenger push his lug-
gage to make additional space in the overhead bin may not be
pleased by the actions of the fellow passenger, but he understands
the purpose for the touch and realizes such conduct is part of mod-
em-day travel. Thus, he has no ordinary privacy interest or tort claim
against that type of touch. In contrast, the passenger who watches a
police officer squeeze his bag has different expectations and interests
at stake. His expectations and legal rights are different both because
the person doing the squeezing is not a fellow passenger and because
the purpose for the squeeze is different. As noted earlier, police offi-
cers do not squeeze luggage to create additional space in overhead
compartments. Officers squeeze luggage for the purpose of explor-
ing its contents. Therefore, the existence of a passenger's constitu-
I' Transcript of Oral Argument, 2000 WL 268547 at *27, Bond v. Unitcd States, 120 S. CL
1462 (2000) (No. 98-9349).
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tional expectations and interests are partially linked to both the per-
son conducting the squeeze and the purpose for the squeeze. The
Fourth Amendment guarantees the passenger's privacy against gov-
ernment officers, not against private parties. And the officer's pur-
pose is relevant because reasonable bus passengers do not expect that
other passengers or police officers "will, as a matter of course, feel
the [ir] bag[s] in an exploratory manner."''
Lastly, although the Court claims that in determining whether a
search occurred "the issue is not [the officer's] state of mind, but the
objective effect of his actions," one suspects that the officer's purpose
also influenced how the Court viewed the "objective effect" of his
conduct. 181 After all, as Justice Souter's comments demonstrate, the
"objective effect" of an officer's action may depend on the purpose as
well as the consequences of the officer's behavior. For example, the
objective effect of an officer's touching a person in a crowded eleva-
tor or on ajam-packed subway train will no doubt vary depending on
the purpose of the touch. If measured solely in terms of force, the
objective effect of an officer's grab to prevent a rider from falling as
the subway train lurches forward is more intrusive than the effect of
an officer's glancing touch to determine whether a rider possesses a
gun. Yet from a constitutional perspective, the officer's grab to pre-
vent the rider from falling is less intrusive than his glancing touch be-
cause of the different purposes for each touch. Likewise, the Court's
ultimate judgment about the "objective effect" of the officer's
squeeze of Bond's bag was doubtlessly influenced by the knowledge
that the officer's purpose for squeezing was not to create additional
space in the luggage bin, but to look for contraband.
In sum, the results in Carter and Bond do not turn on an objective
legal principle. Instead, these results are achieved by the Court's ad
hoc, subjective balancing of the police officers' conduct against the
defendants' Fourth Amendment interests. In Carter, if the defen-
dants' contact with their host's home had been longer and more sub-
stantial-for instance, if they had regularly visited for several hours,
discussed personal matters (as well as their criminal enterprise), and
were close friends with the host-the defendants might have pre-
vailed. In Bond, if the officer's testimony had been less explicit about
IN Bond, 120 S. Ct. at 1465. See also Craig M. Bradley, The Limits of the Frisk, TRIAL, Aug. 1,
2000, at 69 ("But where the issue is 'Was there a search at all?' the motive of the police may
matter. If a DEA agent on vacation moves a bag in the plane-luggage compartment to make
room for his own and, when the bag emits a puff of marijuana-scented air, arrests the bag
owner, there was no 'search.' He was simply acting as a private individual. But if, while moving
the bag, he squeezes it to see if it contains a 'brick' of metamphetamine or emits the scent of
marijuana, his 'investigatory motive' makes this a search, as in Bond.").
18 daa s net
Bond, 120 S. Ct. at 1465. Cf Anne Salzman Kurzweg, A Jurisprudence of "Squeezes". Bond v.
U.S. and Tactile Inspections of Luggage, 27 SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP. 73, 77 (Nov. 2000) (arguing
that Bond "suggests that it will be difficult to make appropriate analytical distinctions between
law enforcement motive and the objective consequences of challenged official conduct").
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the intensity of his squeeze, then the result in that case might have
been different as well. Neither case is dictated by a constitutional
norm connected to the Fourth Amendment's purpose. The results in
both cases are determined by the Justices' subjective views of the rea-
sonableness of the police intrusion. But even under a traditional
'reasonableness" formula, the results in Carter and Bond seem disor-
dered: persons invited into a home for a brief visit are subject to ar-
bitrary search, but police are barred from squeezing luggage that is
openly exposed in the overhead bin of an interstate bus.
B. What is a "Search" Under the Model of Controlling Police Discretion?
If controlling police discretion rather than the reasonableness
model were the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis, the re-
sults in Carter and Bond might have been different and more sensible.
For example, in Carter, rather than focusing on the purpose of the
defendants' visit or the length of their stay, the Court might have
asked a more basic question: should police be permitted to monitor
arbitrarily the activities of a person or to seize someone randomly
who has been invited into the home of a third party for a brief visit?
The answer to that question should be "no." When this type of police
intrusion is allowed, the rights of the invited guest will not be the only
constitutional interests affected by the intrusion.' " The privacy and
security interests of the homeowner will also be jeopardized where
the police have unchecked authority to search or seize short-term
guests." Whatever the purpose for a guest's visit, or however short
the length of his stay, neither the guest nor the homeowner is enjoy-
ing the right "to be secure" within that home if police have un-
checked discretion to monitor the guest's activities while he is inside
the home.'8
Even if the homeowner's interest in sharing her privacy and secu-
rity is removed from the constitutional calculus, the Fourth Amend-
ment interests of a person invited into another's home should not be
measured by an hourglass or by the reason for the visit. The Fourth
Amendment gives us a right "to be secure" at certain times and places
against governmental searches and seizures that are arbitrary and un-
1 See Weinreb, supra note 153, at 266-69 (arguing that Carter diminishes the "privacy of
place" and "privacy of presence" that individuals expect while on the private premtses of an-
other).
1ss See Carter, 525 U.S. at 107 (GinsburgJ., dissenting) (A homed~wiler places her own pri-
vacy at risk, the Court's approach indicates, when she opens her home to others. uncertain
whether the duration of their stay, their purpose. and their 'acceptance into the household' will
earn protection.").
1 See id at 108 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting) ("As I see it. people are not genunely 'secure in
their... houses... against unreasonable searches and seizures.' U.S. CO\S. anend. IV, if
their invitations to others increase the risk of umarranted governmental peering and prying
into their dwelling places.").
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justified. The purpose of the Amendment, along with the rest of the
Bill of Rights, is to limit police power. When defining the scope of
the Amendment, the judiciary ought to focus on whether the chal-
lenged police conduct should be free of legal control. Consider, for
instance, the argument advanced by the American Civil Liberties Un-
ion in Carter5 The ACLU noted that under the Court's precedents,
if either defendant in Carter had used his host's telephone to discuss a
cocaine deal and an illegal wiretap had recorded the conversation, or
if an unlawfully installed eavesdropping device in the host's kitchen
had captured the defendants' conversations concerning narcotics,
the Court's Fourth Amendment precedents would have invalidated
these police searches.' 6 Should the privacy of Carter's telephone
conversation turn on the purpose of his call? Should Carter's and
John's right to be free of arbitrary government eavesdropping de-
pend upon the length of their stay in Thompson's kitchen? Wiretap-
ping and electronic eavesdropping are covered by the Fourth
Amendment because police officials should not have the authority to
decide for themselves whether to monitor an individual's private con-
versations. The same principle-controlling the discretion of the po-
lice to invade our privacy and personal security-that bars arbitrary
monitoring of Carter's and John's private conversations while in
Thompson's home should also bar arbitrary monitoring of their pri-
vate conduct while in the same home.
Similarly, if checking police discretion were the controlling norm
of Fourth Amendment law, then the result in Bond would be the
same, but the reasoning behind that decision would be different.
Rather than focusing on the intensity of the officer's squeeze or on
the difference between visual and tactile inspection of luggage, the
Court should be asking whether police should have the discretion to
18 See Brief Amicus Curiae of American Civil Liberties Union, et al. at 12, Minnesota v. Car-
ter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998) (No. 97-1147).
186 In Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 176 (1969), the Court established that a viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment occurs when officials "unlawfully overhear[] conversations of a
petitioner himself or conversations occurring on his premises, whether or not lie was present or
participated in those conversations." In a footnote, Alderman explained that "[tihose who con-
verse and are overheard [by illegal electronic surveillance] when the owner is not present also
have a valid objection unless the owner of the premises has consented to the surveillance." Id.
at 179 n.11. Alderman's ruling on the standing of a defendant to contest illegal wiretapping or
eavesdropping that monitors his conversation while in the home or office of another person
paralleled the holding in Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (ruling that the right to
be secure in a home was violated when petitioners' conversations were overheard by a "spike"
microphone that invaded the walls of private premises), and it reflected the earlier views ofJus-
tices Harlan and White. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41,103-04 (1967) (Harlan,J., dissent-
ing) ("I would conclude that, under the circumstances here, the recording of a portion of it
telephone conversation to which petitioner was party would suffice to give him standing to chal-
lenge the validity under the Constitution of the [eavesdropping device installed in another per-
son's office]."); id. at 107 (White, J., dissenting) ("Since Berger was rightfully in Steinman's of-
fice when his conversations were recorded through the Steinman eavesdrop, he is entitled to
have those recordings excluded at his trial if they were unconstitutionally obtained."); see also
Weinreb, supra note 153, at 262, 267 n.48 (making the same point).
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explore randomly the contents of luggage by tactile examination.
The answer to this question should be "no" for two simple reasons.
First, Bond's bag deserved to be protected from arbitrary intrusions.
As the Court recognized, a "traveler's personal luggage is clearly an
'effect' protected by the Amendment.""" Moreover, it was undis-
puted that Bond "possessed a privacy interest in his bag."'" If Bond's
bag fell within the scope of the Amendment's coverage and he pos-
sessed an undeniable privacy interest in that bag, then the bag de-
served protection from a suspicionless police intrusion. No extraor-
dinary governmental interest existed-such as the fear that a bomb
might be smuggled aboard-that justified an unwarranted police in-
trusion. Second, a police squeeze for exploratory purposes is clearly
conduct that jeopardizes the constitutional interest Bond held in the
bag. If, while passengers boarded the bus, an officer had squeezed
the pocket of a coat that Bond was holding, or the purse or knapsack
loosely carried by another passenger, that conduct would clearly
threaten the privacy of the targeted passengers. If those squeezes
undermined privacy, why is the squeeze in Bond different? It isn't.
C. The Court's Car Search Cases Fail to Control Police Discretion
Since 1925, when Carroll v. United States" was decided, the Court
has decided many cases concerning the Fourth Amendment and
automobiles. These decisions have produced a welter of opinions
from the Justices about the scope and meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. In addition to the views of the Justices, legal academics
have written extensively about the application of the Fourth Amend-
ment to automobiles.'D Despite (or perhaps because of) the count-
less judicial opinions and diverse commentary on the subject, the
Court continues to review cases raising novel search and seizure is-
sues involving automobiles. The Court's most recent cases dealing
with this subject, Wyoming v. Houghton and Florida v. Wh1ite, illustrate
197 Bond, 120 S. CL at 1464.
W~ Id-
19 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
190 Legal commentary on the application of the Fourth Amendment to automobiles is exten-
sive. For a sample listing of the scholarship that has assisted my thinking on the subject. see 3
LAFAVE, supra note 90, § 7.2, at 458-508; Forrest R. Black, A Cntique of the Carroll Case. 29
COLbU. L. REv. 1068 (1929); Dery, supra note 8; Martin R. Gardner, Seardhes and Seaures of
Automobiles and Their Contents Fourth Amendment Consideratons in a PostRoss Mrdd, 62 NEB. L
REV. 1 (1983); Joseph D. Grano, Rethinking the Fourth Arendment WMrrant Rquirement, 19 AMf.
CRIM. L. REv. 603 (1982); Harris, Car Wars, supra note 17; Yale Kamisar, "7e 'Autom.hle Sarch"
Cases: The Court Does Little to Clanif' the "Lalb-rinthV of Judsial'neeztamnt'. in 3 TilE SUPREME
COURT: TRENDS AND DEvELOPMEiNLTS 69 (1982); Yale Kamnisar. United States v. Ross: The Court
Takes Another Look at the Container-in-the-Car Situation. in 4 TIlE SUPREME COURT: TRLNDs A D
DEVELOPMENTS 71 (1983); Lewis R. Katz, Automobile Seards and Diinished Exwetatzns in the
Wrrant Clause, 19 AM. CRIM. L. RE%. 557 (1982); David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops. Mhnanty M1otor-
ists, and the Future of tle Fourth Amendmhent 1997 SUP. Cr. REv. 271.
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new divisions among the justices' and will surely foster additional le-
gal commentary on the Court's apparent "love affair" with car
searches.
9 2
My goal in this section is straightforward. I hope to show that the
Court's automobile search doctrine does not control discretionary
police searches; as such, it is inconsistent with the central purpose of
the Fourth Amendment. I will not review the entirety of the Court's
automobile cases. Nor will I attempt to critique the vast legal com-
mentary that has sprung from the Court's cases. The latter goal
would be a Herculean task; my goal is considerably more modest. My
thesis that automobile search doctrine conflicts with the central pur-
pose of the Fourth Amendment rests on two premises. First, auto-
mobile search law is built upon a faulty historical assumption. Carroll,
the original car search case, ruled that warrantless automobile
searches were constitutionally valid, and based that conclusion, in
part, on the premise that the First Congress had enacted legislation
authorizing the warrantless searches of ships.'9 Professor Tom Davies
argues that Carroll's historical judgment was wrong because the
Framers did not intend or anticipate that ship searches would be con-
trolled by the Fourth Amendment.'" More importantly, Professor
Davies's analysis indicates that the Court "effectively rewrote the
Fourth Amendment in Carroll by imposing a modern, relativistic
meaning on the word 'unreasonable."' ' Carroll's shift to a reason-
191 In both Houghton and White, the concurring opinions expose a division within the majority
on the proper scope of the warrantless searches and seizures in question. For example, al-
though Justice Breyer concurred in the Court's judgment in Houghton, his comments indicated
his discomfort with certain aspects of the majority's opinion. See Houghton, 526 U.S. at 307
(Breyer, J., concurring) (noting, without explanation, the rule adopted by the Court "applies
only to automobile searches" and suggesting that a different result would be necessary "if a
woman's purse, like a man's billfold, were attached to her person"). Similarly, in lorida v.
White, Justice Souter wanted a narrower ruling: he was unwilling to construe the Court's hold-
ing as a license to conduct any seizure simply because the State has arbitrarily designated the
item as contraband. See White, 526 U.S. at 566-67 (Souter,J., concurring).
9 See Bradley, supra note 113, at 85 ("The Supreme Court, it would seem, is experiencing
'America's love affair with the automobile.' The Court's interest, however, is not in the driving
of cars, but in the searching of them."). Houghton has already generated commentary that is
critical of the Court's result. See, e.g., Magnus Andersson, Note, Wyoming v. Houghton The Su-
preme Court Moves One Step Closer to Abandoning the Warrant Requirement, 35 GONZ. L. REV. 121
(1999/2000); Dery, supra note 8; Meadows, supra note 9.
193 267 U.S. at 150-51. Carrollexplained that "[t]he Fourth Amendment is to be construed in
the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a
manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citi-
zens." Id. at 149. Professor Sklansky has noted that the history cited by the Carroll Court "had
little to do with common law." Sklansky, supra note 75, at 1768. Instead, Carroll emphasized
"legislation shedding light on what searches and seizures Congress thought were reasonable,
particularly Founding-era statutes that authorized customs officers to search ships without war-
rants." Id. (footnote omitted).
194 According to Professor Davies, "[iln late eighteenth-century thought, ships were neither
'houses, papers, and effects [or possessions]' nor 'places.' They were ships." Davies, supra note
70, at 605-06 (footnote omitted).
195 Davies, supra note 70, at 732 (footnote omitted). Professor Davies is not the first legal
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ableness model for deciding search issues undermined the "Framers'
larger purpose of foreclosing officers from exercising discretionary
authority." If Professor Davies's anal)sis is correct, then the histori-
cal foundation of the automobile search cases collapses. Second,
even if the concerns of the Framers are put aside, the primary under-
pinnings for the modem view-that iarrantless searches of cars and
containers found inside cars are per se reasonable-rests on a logical
framework that defies the notion of restraining discretionary police
searches. The Court's judgments in this area do not rest on theories
connected to the Fourth Amendment's ultimate purpose, but instead
are based on practical concerns of police efficiency and economics.
Carroll v. United States is the cornerstone of modern automobile
search law. Looking to the actions of the First Congress, which pro-
posed the Fourth Amendment, the Court reasoned:
[T]he Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically since the be-
ginning of the Government, as recognizing a necessary difference be-
tween a search of a store, dwelling house, or other structure in respect of
which a proper official wrrant readily may be obtained and a search of a
ship, motor boat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is
not practicable to secure a w-arrant, because the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the uurrant must be
sought.
197
Because the First Congress authorized customs officers to conduct
warrantless searches of ships, "" Carroll concluded that a warrantless
search of an automobile was constitutionally reasonable, provided
there was probable cause for the search.199 Professor Davies contends
scholar to question the historical and legal credentials of CantoXL Shortly after Cant!! was de-
cided, Professor Forrest Black sharply criticized the historical and legal basis of die case. Se
Black, supra note 190.
196 Davies, supra note 70, at 748 n.572.
197 267 U.S. at 153.
193 SeeThe Collection Act of 1789. The Collection Act actually authorized custons officers to
use two different types of warrantless searches. First. section 15 of the Act pennitted warrant-
less, suspicionless searches of ships. See Collection Act of 1789, ch. 5, § 15, 1 Stat. ., reeated by
Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 74, 1 Stat. 145, 178. Second, section 24 of the Act authorized war-
rantless searches of ships where customs officers -shall have reason to suspect" taxable goods
may be on board. See Collection Act, § 24, 1 SIt. at 43; see aLso Cloud, supra note 71, at 1743
(discussing early congressional legislation authorizing ship searches).
M 267 U.S. at 149. The Court explained:
On reason and authority the true rule is that if die search and seizure without a warrnt
are made upon probable cause ... that an automobile or other %chicle contains that
which by law is subject to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are valid. The
Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what %.s deemed an unreasonable
and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public interests as
well as the interests and rights of individual citizens.
Id. Of course, Cano/ did not mention that the warrantless search authori gie to ctos
officers in 1789 wmas aimed at the smuggling of foreign goods across Anenca's international
border, whereas the search in Cantor involved an ordinary police operation within the interior
of the country. Congress has plenary power i[t]o lay and collect Taxes, Duties. Imposts and Ex-
cises," and "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations." U.S. CONST. art. 1. § 8, cls. I & 3.
The Constitution, however, does not grant either Congress or Executive Branch officers equila-
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that Carroll's conclusion that the Framers intended the Fourth
Amendment to govern searches and seizures of ships is "ahistorical."
According to Professor Davies, Carroll's interpreting the Fourth
Amendment to cover ship searches is erroneous for several reasons.
First, it ignores the text of the Amendment."2 Second, it ignores "the
civil-law character of admiralty law as well as the First Congress's ex-
plicit treatment of revenue seizures of ships as admiralty matters.
20'
Third, it ignores the fact that the Court's precedents involving ship
seizures by federal officers never "mentioned the Fourth Amend-
ment, let alone applied it."20 2 Professor Davies concludes that the
"Supreme Court had never suggested that the Fourth Amendment
applied to vessels prior to its decision in Carroll."
203
According to Professor Davies, the Carroll Court committed an-
other interpretative error by ruling that the concept of "reasonable-
ness" provided an alternative ground, independent of the warrant
process, for validating a police search. When explaining why a war-
rantiess search of a car was valid, Carroll stated: "The Fourth
Amendment does not denounce all searches or seizures, but only
such as are unreasonable.",20 Conditioning the legality of a search on
"reasonableness," rather than on the authorization of a judicial
search warrant, was a fundamental shift in Fourth Amendment the-
ory.
[W]hen [Carroll] suggested that the Fourth Amendment only forbade
those police intrusions that were "unreasonable," [it] opened the way for
replacing specific standards of police conduct with the open-ended notion
of "reasonableness" itself. Thus, Carroll set search and seizure doctrine
on a course away from the rules model and toward the generalized-
reasonableness construction [that was later embraced by the modern
Court] 205
The motive for this shift seems obvious: providing law enforce-
ment officers efficient means to enforce Prohibition.2 0 6 But whatever
lent authority to police the interior of the nation. See Black, supra note 190, at 1075 (conceding
Congress's power to routinely stop and search at the international boundary, but noting that
"no constitutional authority can be cited for such a summary procedure when applied to motcr-
ists driving within the boundaries of the United States on a public highway").
2W Davies, supra note 70, at 607. According to Professor Davies, Americans during the fram-
ing-era accepted broad regulation of ships and searches of ships, and "no late eighteenth-
century lawyer would have imagined that ships were entitled to the same common-law protec-
tion due "'houses, papers, and effects.'" Id. at 605 (footnote omitted).
201 Id. at 607.
202
203 Id. at 608.
267 U.S. at 147 (emphasis added).
205 Davies, supra note 70, at 732-33.
20 Chief Justice Taft's majority opinion in Carroll was described by Taft's biographer "as one
more sign that 'there were no lengths to which the ChiefJustice would not go, and along which
he would not attempt to lead the court, in his determination to uphold prohibition enforce-
ment.'" Sklansky, supra note 75, at 1766 (quoting 2 HENRY F. PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF
WILLIAM HowARD TAFT 989 (1939)). But cf. KENNETH M. MURCHISON, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW
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the motive, the shift significantly modified Fourth Amendment the-
ory, and its impact has been enduring' 7
Carroll's judgment that wrarranriless searches of vehicles are consti-
tutionally permissible has been the historical lodestar of automobile
search law for seventy-five years. Indeed, the modern Court has
viewed the Carroll analogy that cars are the equivalent of ships as the
Framers' imputed analysis of automobile searches."'  Professor Da-
vies's analysis indicates that Carrolts interpretation of the Framers' in-
tent may have been misplaced." More importantly, Carrolls shift to a
reasonableness model of Fourth Amendment theory %%as inconsistent
with the Framers' efforts to control discretionary police searches. 2", If
Professor Davies is right,21' the Court can no longer claim that the
DOCTRINES: THE FORGOTrEN NFLF.UENCE OF NATIONAL PROHIBmON 71-73 (1994) (arguing tiat
Prohibition's impact on the Court's Fourth Amendment doctrine as anbiguous: 'Commenta-
tors who called attention to the impact of prohibition generally failed to notice the doubts
about enforcement that were creeping into Fourth Amendment doctrine by the end of the
[1920's]. Not only did the leading prohibition decisions produce dissents, but defendants even
won occasional victories during the second half of the 1920's.").
- Davies, supra note 70, at 733-34 ("[ Canoil] undertook to expand the ex offitio authority of
the police to facilitate social control, and thus marginalized the ,a'rrant process .... Despite
the interlude of the Warren Court, search and seizure doctrine since Caroil has evolved increas-
ingly to favor police power over the security of the citizen. Indeed, dte Burger and Rehnquist
Courts have rather consistently expanded discretionary police authority under the modern ru-
bric of'reasonableness.'" (foomote omitted)).
See Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 564 (1999) ('[Carrlfs] holding was rooted in federal
law enforcement practice at the time of the adoption of the Fourth Amendnent."); %Vioning v.
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999) ('[Caroii concluded that the Framers would hae re-
garded [a warrantless search of a car] as reasonable in light of legislation enacted by Congress
from 1789 through 1799-as well as subsequent legislation from the Founding era and be-
yond-that empowered customs officials to search any ship or vessel ithout a warrant if they
hadprobable cause to believe that it contained goods subject to duty.').
2 Although Professor Davies is critical of Cartoifs interpretation of the Framers' thinking
regarding searches of ships, William Cuddihy is cautious about deriving the Framers' intent
from actions regarding ship searches for a different reason. Cuddihy notes that earfl congres-
sional legislation on ship searches may not be the best source for deriving the Framers' thinking
on the constitutionality of searches of movable vessels and vehicles. Sri Cuddilv. supra note 72.,
at 1491 n.256 ("The documentation on the Collection Act mentions no debates of its sections
concerning search and seizure. In other words. that act does not offer a back-stairs approach to
the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment because debates of those sections either never
occurred or were not recorded."). Cuddihy also notes that te framing-era thinking regarding
the constitutionality of searches of ships or vehicles is inconclusive. Ser id. at 1548-50 (noting
that warrantless searches of ships were allowed when the Fourth Amendment w-s adopted but
that the "extent to which other vehicles were [subject to vwarrantless search] is unknotable.
however, for neither case law nor legislation had significantly illuminated the subject" (footnote
omitted)).
210 Davies, supra note 70, at 748 n.572 (noting -the broad endorsement of discretionary
authority implied in [Carroits reasonableness] standard was inconsistent with the Framers'
larger purpose of foreclosing officers from exercising discretionary authoritq').
I Professor Davies's analysis of the Framers' views on ship searches is generally consistent
with that of Professor Cuddihy, although Professor Cuddihy does not take the categorical posi-
tion espoused by Professor Davies that ship searches were outside te scope of the Fourth
Amendments protection. Professor Cuddihy cites a 1780 ruling by the McKean Court of Pen n-
sylvania as the "only firm precedent on ship searches in American case law." Cuddihy. supra
note 72, at 1549 n.387 (citing Letter from ChiefJustice Thomas McKean to Joseph Reed. who
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genesis of its automobile search law is based on the intent of the
Framers.
When deciding the scope of the Fourth Amendment's protection
against car searches, the Court might understandably be unwilling to
have framing-era thinking on ship searches dictate the results for
modern automobile searches. In fact, despite the efforts of Justices
Scalia and Thomas, current automobile search law is not dominated
by eighteenth-century legal theory; the foundation of car search doc-
trine consists of thoroughly modern judgments regarding the practi-
cal concerns of the police. While the Court's reasoning rests on
modern judgments, those judgments have no nexus with the central
purpose of the Fourth Amendment: controlling police discretion.
Consider, for example, Chambers v. Maroney, 13which sounded the
death knell for the warrant requirement as it applied to car searches
and, coincidentally, was the Burger Court's first major car search
case. In Chambers, the police stopped and arrested the occupants of a
vehicle who were suspected of an armed robbery. Rather than
searching the vehicle at the place of arrest, the car was towed to a po-
lice station and subsequently searched. Inside a compartment under
the dashboard, police found evidence tying the defendants to the
armed robbery. Chambers ruled that the warrantless search did not
violate the Fourth Amendment.
After conceding that neither Carroll nor its progeny established
"that in every conceivable circumstance the search of an automobile
even with probable cause may be made without the extra protection
for privacy that a warrant affords," 214 Justice White addressed the crux
of the issue confronting the Court.
Arguably, because of the preference for a magistrate's judgment, only the
immobilization of the car should be permitted until a search warrant is
obtained; arguably, only the "lesser" intrusion is permissible until the
magistrate authorizes the "greater." But which is the "greater" and which
the "lesser" intrusion is itself a debatable question and the answer may
depend on a variety of circumstances. For constitutional purposes, we
see no difference between, on the one hand, seizing and holding a car
before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and, on the
other hand, carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given
probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth
was President of the Pennsylvania Supreme Executive Council (July 10, 1780), reprinted in 8
PENNSYLVANIA ARCHIVES 403-04 (1853)). That ruling denied a request from the French consul
for a general warrant to search any ship in Philadelphia's harbor and to seize any person sus-
pected to be a seaman deserted from a French ship. Professor Davies counters that the 1780
ruling did not extend constitutional protections to ships, but instead reaffirmed the illegality of
a eneral arrest warrant. See Davies, supra note 70, at 750 n.377.
See Houghton, 526 U.S. at 307 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that history should be used
"to inform, but not automatically to determine, the answer to a Fourth Amendment question").
213 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
214 Id. at 50.
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The upshot of Justice White's logic goes beyond the result in
Carroll by eliminating the warrant requirement for car searches in
cases presenting no exigency for an immediate search.' But there is
more to Chambers than simply removing car searches from the wrar-
rant process. Police are given the power to search cars, but the justi-
fications for this power are not tied to a principle connected to the
Fourth Amendment's raison d'itre Police are given the power to
search based on their own assessment of probable cause because the
Court is unable to decide whether a search or temporary seizure is a
"lesser" intrusion 21 and cannot see a constitutional distinction be-
tween a temporary seizure and an immediate search. These justifica-
tions are not connected to controlling police discretion. Chambers in
fact expands police power and discretion. The Court authorizes po-
lice to seize a car and search it later or to conduct an immediate
search. Either intrusion is permissible according to the Court, and
police do not have tojustifi their choice. Concedediy, the mobility of
an automobile presents an exigency that justifies a temporary seizure,
and there may be circumstances where an immediate search is neces-
sary. But a warrantless search in a context where the occupants
have been safely placed under custody, the car is under the control of
the police, and there is no threat to police safety, cannot be justified
by a norm that is relevant to the Fourth Amendment. 
2 1 9
215 Id. at 51-52.
216 As Justice Harlan's dissent noted, Chambers not only authorizes a warrantless search of a
car at the scene of the arrest, but "appears to go further and to condone the removal of tie car
to the police station for a warrantless search there at the convenience of the police. I cannot
agree that this result is consistent with our insistence in other areas tit departures from the
warrant requirement strictly conform to the exigency presented." Id. at 62-63 (Harlan, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (foomote omitted). See also Katz, supra note 190. at 566
("[Chambers] extended the warrant requirement uaiver to a situation where it was demonstrably
unnecessary.").
217 Unable to decide which police power is more constitutionally obnoxious for te citizen.
the search or temporary seizure, Chambers "authorizes both." Chambmrs, 399 U.S. at 63 n.8
(HarlanJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As Christopher Slobogin has noted, tie
Chambers Court's "rationale is specious." See Slobogin, supra note 69, at 21 n.6l. If tie Court
was truly unable to decide which police power %%as more offenshe, it should have allowed the
citizen the opportunity to decide for herself which is more intrusive. t Ctiamtnm, 399 U.S. at
64 (Harlan,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (observing that a citizen who does not
want the car to be detained to await the magistrate's judgment regarding probable cause "al-
ways remains free to consent to an immediate search, thus avoiding any delay ° or detention of
the vehicle).
218 See Chambers, 399 U.S. at 64 n.9 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("Circumstances might arise in which it would be impracticable to immobilize tie car for the
time required to obtain a warrant-for example, where a single police officer must take ar-
rested suspects to the station, and has no way of protecting the suspects' car during his absence.
In such situations it might be wholly reasonable to perform an on-the-spot search based on
probable cause.").
219 In United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982),Justice Stevens sought to defend the reason-
ing of Chambers that trivialized the difference between searching a vehicle on tie roaday at the
time of an initial seizure and searching an impounded vehicle while awaiting tie sanction of a
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Chambers severed car searches from the warrant process, but it did
not address whether closed containers found inside automobiles
could also be searched based on an officer's assessment of probable
cause. That significant question would be addressed in the tandem
cases of United States v. Ross 2 0 and California v. Acevedo72' In deciding
that closed containers could be searched without judicial approval,
the practical concerns of the police prevailed over a rule that would
restrict discretionary police searches.
Prior to 1982, the Court's cases distinguished between a general
search of a car based on probable cause that evidence was located
somewhere in the vehicle, and a situation where police only have
probable cause to search a particular container that happened to be
located in a car. The former search was permissible, but the latter
search was not.222 What the Court had not decided was whether po-
lice, engaged in a lawful search of a car, could search closed contain-
ers found inside the vehicle.f Ross ruled that police could search
closed containers found during a general search of a car. Writing for
the Court, Justice Stevens explained that the "scope of a warrantless
search based on probable cause is no narrower-and no broader-
than the scope of a search authorized by a warrant supported by prob-
warrant. Id. at 807 n.9. In accordance with Chambers, Justice Stevens implied that so long as
probable cause supported the search at the time of the initial seizure, a suspended warrantless
search of an impounded vehicle would not offend the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 807. Nine
years later, the Court once again adhered to the rationale of Chambers in Cafornia v. Acevedo,
500 U.S. 565 (1991), and noted that regardless of when an officer chooses to search the vehicle,
the existence of probable cause, whether determined by a magistrate or an officer, would sup-
port a search under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 570 ("Following Chambers, if the police have
probable cause to justify a warrantless seizure of an automobile on a public roadway, they may
conduct either an immediate or a delayed search of the vehicle."). However, by employing the
rationale of both Ross and Acevedo, officers are free to exercise their own discretion in deciding
whether the requirement of probable cause has been fulfilled. Instead of pursuing a warrant,
officers will increasingly rely on their own determinations of probable cause. See Dery, supra
note 8, at 561 ("The very assumption that an officer's probable cause determination is suffi-
cient, even absent the exigency that exists during a vehicle stop on the road, could undermine
the rationale for a warrant requirement itself. If an officer need not obtain a warrant when an
arrestee is securely in custody and his or her car is safely immobilized, why require priorjudicial
approval in any event?"). By abandoning the preference for the warrant in car searches, the
inevitable result is an increase in arbitrary police intrusions that conflict with the very protec-
tions that the Fourth Amendment sought to preserve. See id. ("Thus, in its first attempt at ex-
plicitly defining the scope of the automobile exception, the [Chambers] Court cast a shadow
over the fundamental Fourth Amendment protection of the warrant preference.").
2" 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
221 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
Compare Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (ruling permissible the general search
of a car ), with United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (ruling impermissible the warrant-
less search of a 200 pound footlocker that was found in the trunk of a car) and Arkansas v.
Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) (ruling impermissible the warrantless search of a suitcase found in
the trunk of taxicab).
22 See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 90, § 7.2(d), at 492-93 (noting that Robbins v. California, 453 U.S.
420 (1981), had not definitively resolved the issue, while the search-incident-to-arrest rule
adopted in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), "made the issue important only as to con-
tainers located other than in the passenger compartment or in vehicles other than those as to
which an occupant was contemporaneously arrested").
[Vol. 3:1
Feb. 2001] FOURTH AMEDMEAVA ".A rD IGUEASSDOCTRNE
an the scope of a search authorized by a wrarrant supported by prob-
able cause."24 Thus, police may search any closed container found
during a lawful search of a car because the scope of a search is not
"defined by the nature of the container," but rather by "the object of
the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe
that it may be found."2 In reaching this conclusion, Ross rejected a
rationale that had surfaced in some of the Court's earlier rulings re-
lated to car searches. Notably, Ross rejected tie "unpersuasive asser-
tion" that an individual has a reduced privacy interest in the con-
cealed areas of a car or in a closed container. Ross also conceded
that a warrantless search could not be justified by the exigency or dif-
ficulty of securing a closed container.f If neither a reduced privacy
interest nor an exigency justified a search of a dosed container, what
was the justification for such a search? Ross explained that "practical
considerations" justified the search: "Prohibiting police from open-
ing immediately a container in which the object of the search is most
likely to be found and instead forcing them first to comb the entire
vehicle would actually exacerbate the intrusion on privacy inter-
ests."22 Moreover, because an officer "could never be certain that the
contraband was not secreted in a yet undiscovered portion of the ve-
hicle," in many cases "the vehicle would need to be secured while a
warrant was obtained." m  Ross concluded that the latter scenario
would be inconsistent with the power and discretion authorized in
Carroll and Chambers.n
Although Justice Stevens's reasoning in Ross paralleled the logic of
Chambers, he left intact a rule developed during the interval between
Chambers and Ross- police must obtain a search warrant where prob-
able cause is confined to a particular container located in a car.
Nine years later, however, that loophole was closed in California v.
AcevedoY" over the strong dissent ofJustice Stevens. Acevedo reasoned
that "it is better to adopt one clear-cut rule to govern automobile
searches and eliminate the warrant requirement for closed contain-
24 Ross, 456 U.S. at 823.
i
22 See3 LAFAVE, supra note 90, § 7.2(d), at 497. In Ross the Court explained that.
[clertainly the privacy interests in a car's trunk or glove comparunent may be no less
than those in a movable container. An indihidual undoubtedly has a significant interest
that the upholstery of his automobile %ill not be ripped or a hidden comparunent %ithin
it opened. These interests must )yield to the authority of a search. howemer ....
456 U.S. at 823.
2 456 U.S. at 821 n.28 ("Arguably, the entire vehicle itself (including its upholstery) could
be searched without a wrant, with all wrapped articles and containers found during that
search then taken to a magistrate.").
= Id.
231 I& at 824 (noting that although the Court has "rejected some of the reasoning m Sandzm.
we adhere to our holding in that case.").
500 U.S. 565 (1991).
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ers" entirely. 3  Thus, a search of a closed container found in a car is
perse reasonable if "the[] search is supported by probable cause.
The "clear-cut" rule adopted by Acevedo is not surprising in light of
Chambers and Ross. As Acevedo explained, the Court's prior precedents
had "drawn a curious line between the search of an automobile that
coincidentally turns up a container and the search of a container that
coincidentally turns up in an automobile."2 3 Acevedo concluded that
either search was reasonable because "[t] he protections of the Fourth
Amendment must not turn on such coincidences." 36  The Acevedo
Court was right to note that the validity of a search should not turn
on such uncertainties. Absent a true emergency or consent, a search
of a closed container should never be permitted without judicial
authorization. This per se rule, and not the per se rule created in
Acevedo, would control discretionary searches. After all, why should a
container, whether found after a general search of a car, or discov-
ered in a car after a limited search for the container, be subject to
search based on a police assessment of probable cause?
The modern Court's answer to this question is that "practical con-
siderations" just'3r searching containers discovered during a general
237search of a car. As noted above, if police could not immediately
search a container, they would be forced to "comb the entire vehicle"
looking for contraband, which would "exacerbate the intrusion on
privacy interests. " 238 The Court has also noted that if containers were
not subject to immediate search, in some cases, the vehicle itself
"would need to be secured while a warrant was obtained."2 39 What the
Court labels "practical considerations" are really "police considera-
tions." The first concern is easily alleviated: if a motorist does not
wish to experience the additional intrusion that would be occasioned
by "comb [ing] the entire vehicle," he can consent to a search of the
container.240 But whether a motorist consents to an immediate search
or not, in the real world, police will continue to search the entire
car.21' The best way to put an end to such discretionary searches is to
overrule Carroll and Chambers, which provided the historical and logi-• 242 "43
cal foundation for Ross and Acevedo.
2 Id. at 579.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 580.
236 Id.
237 Ross, 456 U.S. at 820.
238 Id. at 821 n.28.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 838 (Marshall,J., dissenting) ("[Tihe defendant, not the police, should be afforded
the choice whether he prefers the immediate opening of his suitcase or other container to the
delayw incident to seeking a warrant.").
Id. (If police "are looking more generally for evidence of a crime, the immediate opening
of the container will not protect the defendant's privacy; whether or not it contains contraband,
the police will continue to search for new evidence.").
24 Cf 3 LAFAvE, supra note 90, § 7.2(d), at 498 ("The conclusion reached here-albeit
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Overruling Carroll and Chmndbers, however, would entail significant
costs for police departments nationwide. Indeed, the avoidance of
these costs is the best explanation for the modern Court's car search
doctrine. Discretionary car searches could be restrained b' requiring
warrants before a search.
[But this mandate] would have imposed a constitutional requirement
upon police departments of all sizes around the country to have avnilable
the people and equipment necessary to transport impounded automo-
biles to some central location until w%-arrants could be secured. Moreover,
once seized automobiles were taken from the highmay the police would
be responsible for providing some appropriate location where they could
be kept, with due regard to the safety of the vehicles and their contents,
until a magistrate ruled on the application for a w%-arrant. Such a consti-
tutional requirement therefore would have imposed severe, even impos-
244sible, burdens on many police departments.
This concern-the costs associated with impounding vehicles and
their contents-is the only legitimate argument available to counter
the Fourth Amendment interests of motorists. The other arguments
proffered by the Court over the years-for instance, the inability to
decide whether a search of the car is a "greater" intrusion than a
temporary seizure of the car,2" the minimal protection of privacy
served by a rule that requires a w%,arrant when police have cause only
to search a particular container found in a car, and the alleged con-
fusion for judges and police officers generated by automobile search
law"--have been evasions design to mask the Court's unwillingness
both to impose significant economic burdens on police departments
and to restrain discretionary car searches.2'' Because controlling dis-
cretionary authority is the underlying vision of the Fourth Amend-
ment,249 it should be the ultimate focus of the Court. The %ay to re-
strain discretionary automobile searches is to require judicial
warrants prior to a search, unless an emergency or a credible threat
somewhat reluctantly--is that Ross was correctly decided within the fraineork of then existing
Fourth Amendment law because it is more akin to Chimrtds than to CadwidL This is to sa) no
more, however, than that Ross is as solidly grounded as is the earlier Chadm b decision; both
cases together raise fundamental questions about the Fourth Amendment warrnmt require-
ment").
24s Cf. Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 583 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (stating that the Aeevdo
holding is not "some momentous departure, but rather [ius merely the continuation of an in-
consistentjurisprudence that has been with us for years.').
244 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 765-66 n.14 (1979) (citation omitted).
245 Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51-52.
246 Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 575 ("To the extent that the Chada'irk-Sandrrs rule protects pri-acy, its
protection is minimal .... 'Since the police, by hypothesis, have probable cause to seize the
property, we can assume that a warrant will be routinely forthcoming in tie omerwhelung ma-
jority of cases.'" (citation omitted)).
24 Id. at576.
248 See Maclin, supra note 130, at 776-86.
249 See, eg., Davies, supra note 70, at 736 ("The Framers] banned general %,rrants in order
to prevent the officer from exercising discretionary authorit.).
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to police safety exists.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's vagueness doctrine has traditionally been
designed to promote diverse legal interests. One such interest is to
protect the freedoms enumerated in the Bill of Rights. Thus, it has
been said that vagueness doctrine "has very intimate connections
both with the substance of individual freedom from arbitrary and dis-
criminatory governmental action and... with the federal institu-
tional processes established to protect that freedom.""2 ' This article
has argued that the Court should once again look to vagueness doc-
trine to protect a freedom enshrined in the Bill of Rights; namely, the
privilege against arbitrary and capricious police intrusion embodied
in the Fourth Amendment. Search and seizure law should adopt an
essential feature of vagueness law: controlling police discretion. If
this constitutional norm were incorporated into the Court's Fourth
Amendment cases, the right of all persons "to be secure" against un-
reasonable searches and seizures would stand on stronger ground.
250 Amsterdam, supra note 25, at 88.
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